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ABSTRACT 
This thesis labors to unpack Georges Bataille’s enigmatic statement, “to laugh is to 
think”, treating this “impossible thought” as a paradigmatic expression of Bataille’s self-
characterized “philosophy of laughter.”  Overall, this thesis interrogates Bataille’s “philosophy 
of laughter” as an attempt to stimulate an “awakening” of consciousness to the dissolution of 
consciousness.  En route, this thesis argues that such an “awakening” evokes a privileged 
expression of the movement of “communication” around which Bataille’s theoretical writing is 
structured, positing the “philosophy of laughter” as an effort to solder the movement of 
“communication” through the domain of epistemology itself. 
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1 INTRODUCTION TO THE PHILOSOPHY OF LAUGHTER  
All the universe is laughing at you. 
     —Jack Spicer, “The Unvert Manifesto” (1956) 
1.1 An Atheological Awakening 
In 1920, renegade surrealist and “paradoxicalist” philosopher of “nonknowledge,” 
Georges Bataille (1897–1962), then a student of medieval paleography and numismatics at the 
École de Chartes in Paris, traveled to London to conduct research for his thesis on L’Ordre de 
chevalerie, a thirteenth-century didactic poem which prescribed the chivalric decorum and habits 
of behavior appropriate for Christian knights (GB 23).  Despite having been raised without any 
particular religious affinities, Bataille had been a practicing Roman Catholic since 1914.  
Bataille’s dalliance with Catholicism, however, his “faith” during these formative years, was 
driven more by “violent longings” than credulity, a fervor compelled by “a round of unseemly, 
vertiginous ideas . . . already full of anxieties, rigorous and crucifying,” rather than a resolve to 
accept the certainties of doctrinal assurances (GB 24-33; IE 34). 
While in London, Bataille had the opportunity to meet renowned utilitarian philosopher, 
Henri Bergson, and in anticipation of the meeting, Bataille read Bergson’s 1900 treatise, 
Laughter.  Bataille described this London rendezvous twenty years later as “the occasion out of 
which laughter arose” (IE 66, original emphasis).  “[L]aughter was revelation,” Bataille insists in 
his recounting of the Bergson encounter in Inner Experience (1943), though this was not the sort 
of revelation which may be expected, nor one which Bataille himself could have foreseen, given 
his dogmatic inclinations at time (IE 66).  Firstly, this laugh, though distinctly human, cannot be 
annexed into the discrete experience of any respective human subject: this laughter “belongs” to 
no one in particular, not even to Bataille.  The “revelation” it “communicates” confirms no 
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“salvation” for the subject at the mercy of laughter.  Rather, this revelatory laugh “opened up the 
depth of things,” “a roar of irreconciliation” exposing “the extreme limit of the ‘possible’” (IE 
66; Borch-Jacobsen 148; IE 42).  Laughter intuits the abrogation of the “profane” sphere of the 
discursive subject, abruptly abolishing all his metaphysical ideals and utilitarian pipedreams of 
eventual self-sufficiency.  Rather than the providential “revelation” which would expectedly 
affirm, announce, or accompany the subject’s dogmatic deliverance unto an anticipated, 
presupposed “evasion of the impossible” (i.e., “salvation”), this reverberating revelation 
shipwrecks the whole horizon of human valuation, effectively relinquishing “revelation” of its 
holy baggage, having turned “salvation” into “the trampoline of the impossible” (NL 21-3).1  
This iridescent spell, in whose grasp Bataille would remain perennially caught for the 
next forty years of his obsessive intellectual life, was a “sudden revelation which revealed the 
relativity of everything” (Borch-Jacobson 148).  Bataille avows that his unforeseen deliverance 
“into a kind of dive, which tended to be vertiginous, into the possibility of laughter” coincided 
with the alienation of his religious allegiances: “at first I had laughed, upon emerging from a 
long Christian piety, my life having dissolved, with a spring-like bad faith, in laughter” (NLT 
139; IE 66, original emphasis).  Elsewhere, Bataille maintains that “the first effect” that ensued 
from his having descended into “the sphere of laughter” was the swift ruin of the precise 
                                                 
1 “The possible and the impossible are both in the world,” starts Bataille’s essay, “Nietzsche’s Laughter” (18).  
While “the possible,” in Bataille’s lexicon, refers to “organic life and its development,” “[t]he impossible is the final 
death, the necessity of destruction for existence” (18).  In the context of specifically human reality and experience, 
the possible also describes the limits of acceptable human behavior and experience through its constitutive 
attachment to the discursive economy of subject and object, self and other.  If this “discontinuity” between subject 
and object organizes the horizon of human “possibility,” one can imagine how adherence to a system of thought 
and/or belief that subscribes to a confidence in the providence or “truth” of the “possible” imposes a moral 
imperative to abide by the law lain down by reason and discourse.  The “impossible,” on the other hand, indicates 
“the loss of self” (24).  Moreover, the notion of “salvation,” or the will to save or be “saved,” “signifies the 
resolution to escape the impossible” (21).  For should “God” truly exists, then truly nothing’s impossible: that is, 
there is no “impossible,” no “loss of self,” should such a guarantor of “being” truly exists.  The “revelation” Bataille 
experiences in a burst of laughter is the revelation of the “impossible,” the revelation of an accursed arena of human 
experience in stark contradiction to any system of thought and/or belief that situates human “being” solely along the 
discursive, moral axis of “possibility.” 
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religious faith which “completely animated” him at the time: “[E]verything that the dogma 
brought me [was] carried away by a type of difluvial flood that decomposed it” (NLT 140).  
Laughter was an atheological awakening: “Atheology,” Bataille explains, refers to “the science 
of the death or destruction of God (the science of the thing being destroyed inasmuch as it is a 
thing)” (AFS 167).  This “science,” as Stuart Kendall observes, elides the objectivity constitutive 
to scientific inquiry, positing in its place “a science of immediacy,” a “science” that disavows the 
discursive “discontinuity” between subject and object on which the scientific method of 
identification, assimilation, and homogenization is wholeheartedly staked (“Editor’s 
Introduction” xxxviii).  Thus, “atheology” is “a science against science, a philosophy against 
knowledge” (“Editor’s Introduction” xxxviii).  A “science” or “system” that resists systematic 
determination, a system of de-systemization, “atheology” seeks to “create . . . the experience of 
the instant” by collapsing the externality posited by the mediating interventions of discourse, the 
subject slipping into the deleterious night of “nonknowledge,” into an unmediated, unmitigated 
tête-à-tête with death that disallows intermediaries between subject and object (TD 122).  And 
yet, as Julia Kristeva explains, unlike Hegel, Bataille refrains from “leaving aside [the moment 
of immediacy] as an indeterminate nothing, like a simple negation of consciousness and of the 
presence of the subject,” but rather “he designates its concrete and material determinations” 
(BEP 254).  Such an “awakening” to the materiality of immediacy, in effect, embraces a sudden 
exposure of consciousness to the death of consciousness, “a consciousness of the absence of 
consciousness” (NR 129).2  Of course, such an “inner experience” cannot be sustained, nor does 
                                                 
2 I have borrowed this usage of the term “awakening” from Denis Hollier’s “The Dualist Materialism of Georges 
Bataille.”  Hollier distinguishes “the exercise of thought”—its habitual, discursive, “profane” mode of operation—
from its “awakening.”  Hollier’s analysis takes root in Bataille’s consistent association of reason and work (i.e., “the 
exercise of thought”) with utility and servility.  Because reason always works in the service of utility, and because 
being useful means serving some further end, some anticipated futurity outside immediate experience, reason 
constitutively reflects a servility to useful means.  Reason, in other words, reflects a conservatism or docility, always 
conforming to the work of its own ideological apparatuses which tout the functional instrumentalization of human 
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it desire to sustain itself, even less to discipline or enlighten others, for the identificatory integrity 
of the subject who would presume to sustain it has been spent.  Laughter is one among many 
such distinctly human “inner experiences,” “one among many effusions, one among many 
deliriums, one among many means to the impossible”—alongside erotic ecstasy, tears, art, 
sacrifice—that attests to immediacy as that which is “essential to experience” (Kendall, “Editor’s 
Introduction” xxxix; BEP 254). 
In this thesis, I argue that the meteoric “intimacy” of atheological consciousness, of this 
highly contingent “awakening” of consciousness to the “sovereign instant” of its rifting, finds its 
privileged presentation and performance in Bataille’s meditations on the “lived experience” of 
laughter and, more specifically, in Bataille’s fervent efforts to engage this “lived experience” at 
the level of epistemology (AS III 202).  Bataille famously self-characterized his own thought as a 
“philosophy of laughter,” a modality of thought which allegedly “never proceeds independently 
of [the] experience” of laughter (NLT cite).  This “philosophy of laughter” receives perhaps its 
most confounding—and, no doubt, laughable—articulation in the blunt coincidence of laughter 
and thought evinced in a laconic aside Bataille delivers in “Meditations of Method”: “to laugh is 
to think” (MM 90).  The impossibility of this daft little claim—again, the “impossible,” for 
Bataille, always indexes “the loss of self”—is glaringly conspicuous, as this claim presumes an 
                                                 
experience as the progressive, providential character of human “being”: “Work is only a means,” writes Bataillin 
The Tears of Eros (1964), and “the search for means is always, in the last instance, reasonable” (TE 19).  For 
Hollier, “the exercise of thought” seeks reasonable, useful means in order to afford itself “a clarity which gives it the 
impression of mastery” (DM 59).  Utility, as such, takes shape as a moral imperative: the exercise of thought, which 
upholds or obeys the law of reason in everything, envisions reasonable means as inherently “good,” and therefore, 
this “exercise” is bound by “the good toward which it gropes” (DM 59).  The “awakening” of thought, on the other 
hand, runs counter to this routinizing activity because it implies the provocation of aberrant, “insubordinate” 
thoughts, those which the movement towards clarity and meaning skirt in order to posit a morality as thought’s 
condition of possibility.  Thus, the “awakening” of thought “begins with the contradictory and paralyzing 
consciousness of evil, of something which suspends thought because it cannot be thought and willed at the same 
time” (DM 59).  The awakening of thought, in other words, (re)introduces consciousness to a disquieting 
heterogeneity, which tends to resist being thought, effectively exposing this now “awakened” mind to what’s 
“beyond” the good and evil binary “which it would simultaneously bring out” (DM 60).   
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explicit simultaneity between thought and that capricious spasm that annuls its “exercise” (NL 
18).  And yet, Bataille’s impossible thought—“to laugh is to think”—insists upon a kind of 
turbulent awareness at the precise moment in which the temporal mediations and discursive 
limitations which dialectically divide experience into subject – object relations (and thus make 
self-consciousness possible) are sundered, at the moment in which “the exercise of thought” 
bursts into the flames of an inappropriable, acephalous experience.  It insists upon an 
“awakening” to the “impossible” (“the loss of self”), to what’s unthinkable or unknowable about 
experience insofar as it lies beyond the boundaries of possibility circumscribed by dialectical 
discourse: it insists, in short, upon an awakening to immediacy.  By peering philosophically (or 
“reflectively”) into the very “blind spot” of the philosophical gaze, Bataille’s “philosophy of 
laughter” explores the possibility of “awakening” to the death of consciousness as we know it, to 
the possibility of an “awakened” consciousness emerging in a movement of thought that 
annihilates it(self)—a consciousness which laughs and cries.  Like Mallarmé’s master, or Eliot’s 
Phlebas, consciousness metamorphoses into something other than itself, “awakening” to the 
unlocatable whirlpool into which it drowns, consciousness itself becoming nothing if not the 
very vortex whose riptide floods consciousness with that excess of life which Bataille calls 
“lived experience” (or “intimate life”) (TR 46).3 
                                                 
3 “Intimacy,” writes Bataille, “is not expressed by a thing except on one condition: that this thing be essentially the 
opposite of a thing, the opposite of a product, of a commodity—a consumption and a sacrifice” (AS I 132, original 
emphasis).  Intimacy refers precisely to that which “cannot be expressed discursively,” to the feverous domain of 
passionate heat, “the crucible where distinctions melt” (TR 50, 54).  “Intimate life” comes forth in the violent 
consumption of the world of things, in the destruction of the world of industry and action, meaning and difference.  
It is a zone of experience that heaves with “the passion of an absence of individuality,” with that which is “not 
compatible with the positing of the separate individual” (TR 50-1).  It is the scene of the scream of a wretch who 
spots the blade coming for his throat, a formless consumption of energy so immediate that the discontinuity between 
subject and object cannot be realized or supposed but only dissolved and, along with it, the lucid and distinct human 
order itself (i.e., “profane life”) (TR 50-1).   
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Bataille’s “philosophy of laughter” evokes a necessarily “impossible” effort to transfigure 
epistemological activity into that incendiary “truth of the universe” which Bataille calls 
“nonproductive expenditure,” an unlimited movement towards unrestrained loss epitomized by 
the solar brilliance whose luminosity interminably boils, void of the purposive presupposition of 
returns (DM 67).  Expenditure (qua unending, unchecked loss) is the ungraspable singularity of 
experience which is radically irreconcilable with the tempering benevolence of reason, morality, 
and work.  Denis Hollier explains, “[S]ince expenditure is ultimately the unthinkable par 
excellence, thought itself is the suspension of expenditure” (DM 67, original emphasis).  The 
“philosophy of laughter,” as such, measures up to an “impossible” attempt to conciliate the 
operation of thought with what this operation constitutively “suspends” and with what, in turn, 
ruins this operation.  It thereby suggests a mode of “reflection” that shares a profound “intimacy” 
with what remains and, in a sense, must remain—“What is hidden in laughter must remain so”—
unknown, unknowable, even unthinkable about human experience (IE 66).  Indeed, in identifying 
the movement of thought with laughter’s compulsive, irruptive bursting, Bataille situates thought 
at precisely the point of coincidence at which “the exercise of thought” jumps the dialectical rails 
on which it routinely rides.  As such, the mode of “reflection” denoted by the designation 
“philosophy of laughter” amounts to an epistemological practice whose movement reflects (or 
seeks to reflect) its own ontological catastrophe, its own incessant dissolution into the 
unthinkable immediacy of experience.  My central assertion in this thesis is thus that Bataille’s 
“philosophy of laughter” evokes a privileged, albeit “impossible,” effort to convert the acute 
affective alterity and unreserved explosiveness of “lived experience” into an epistemological 
condition.   
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1.2 On the Contagion of Subjectivity 
Bataille laughs at Bergson—“this careful little man philosopher!”—for having 
“instrumentalized” laughter, turning it into a moral, sociological tool to be deployed for the 
purposes of adjusting the “mechanical inelasticity” of one’s fellow human, who either slips and 
falls or otherwise betrays some psychological or bodily breach in established modes of behavior 
(IE 66; Parvulescu 87; Bergson 16).  Such perfunctory transgressions of the accepted order of 
things, for Bergson, indicate the possibility of potentially dangerous contradiction or crime.  
Anca Parvulescu explains of Bergson: “Laughter is a useful social gesture, to be used in the 
formation and reproduction of a group” (87).  Laughter (qua this “social gesture”) secures a 
specific sociological, moralistic utility and purpose: laughter is the response of a necessarily 
closed and limited group, a “social gesture” implying a kind of “freemasonry,” whereby the 
group reinforces a stable identity by correcting the automated eccentricities of the falling other 
(Bergson 16-7; Parvulescu 4-5).  Things could not be more different for Bataille: laughter, along 
with erotic ecstasy, wrecks the rational foundations and exclusionary operations by which we 
affirm a group identity.  It is not the mechanical slippage of the other which would designate the 
potentially hazardous transgression in the laughable scenario.  Rather, it is the burst of laughter 
itself which poses the threat to the repressive regularity of established order and civic life.  “The 
rire [laughter],” writes Joseph Libertson, “interrupts the profane, conservative motivation of 
thought” (221).  Laughter is “irreducibly opposed” to discourse, conservation, and work; it is 
“essentially non-conservative,” useless, prodigal, bastard—a privileged expression of what 
Bataille will call “unemployed negativity” (Parvulescu 81; G 111). 
Paradoxically, a kind of “community” emerges from the epistemological wreckage, 
though a community not recognizable in any conventional sense of commonality (i.e., de facto 
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community).  Rather, this community, which Jean-Luc Nancy calls “inoperable” and Maurice 
Blanchot “unavowable,” can perhaps best be understood as a community of non-recognition: 
“communication” occurs when the boundaries of personal identity are foregone, when all 
anticipation and hope “dissolve into NOTHING” (AS III 208, original emphasis).  We 
“communicate” in the “sovereign moments” in which our discursive dexterity and its productive 
apparatuses fold to the “interrogation” of erotic silence or to the “contestations” erupting through 
purposeless, excessive outpourings of laughter: “lucidity made of incessant contestations itself, 
ultimately dissolving in laughter (in nonknowledge)” (G 91).  This irrepressible “community,” 
wherein we experience the lacerating “communication” of “the moment of violent contact, when 
life slips from one person to another,” is a being-in-common defined by the dissolution of 
definitions (G 129).  An inner violence or mutilation (of self) “communicates” the shared 
experience of human subjectivity’s profound finitude.  Rather than serving as a kind of 
disciplinary machinery bent on bending bumbling bystanders back into rank (à la Bergson), 
laughter (qua “communication”) “is criminal and suicidal”: “All ‘communication’ participates in 
suicide, in crime” (Lingis 122; ON 26, original emphasis).  For laughter (qua “communication”) 
involves the contagious release or expenditure of untenable, untamable, unusable energies which 
imperil the porous procedures, projects, and performances by which we seek to affirm our claim 
to knowledge, self-identification, and self-sufficiency through the construction and reification of 
the group. 
My interrogation of Bataille’s “philosophy of laughter” is rooted in Andrew Mitchell and 
Jason Winifree’s supposition that “the entire effort” of Bataillean thought is “dedicated” to the 
demonstration and delivery of “the obscure region [of experience] closed to phenomenology” 
designated by the term “communication” (1; G 212).  This “accursed” arena of experience 
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corresponds precisely to that which is incommunicable with respect to articulated discourse 
insofar as it involves an experience of consumptive contact whose intensity and violence rupture 
the discursive homogeneity of the discrete subject whose differential isolation (qua “I”) guards 
the possibility of the articulable acquisition and exchange of material and conceptual 
commodities.  Critics generally concur that “communication” and the “contagious subjectivity” 
(subjectivité contagieuse) of its nocturnal caress occupy an essential place in Bataillean thought; 
however, as Nidesh Latwoo accurately observes, spats abound apropos of the question of what 
kind of human subject “informs and underlies this thought” (73).  I contend that the subject (in 
both senses of the word) of Bataillean thought cannot be dissociated from the heterogeneous 
subject emergent in the crucible of “communication.”  Writing on the related subject of the 
matrix of transgression, Michel Foucault posits “a curious intersection of beings that have no 
other life beyond this moment where they totally exchange their beings” (34, my emphasis).  
More specifically, the subject of Bataillean thought is the subject caught in the “difluvial flood” 
of laughter’s spell, a subject which, in bursting (into laughter) and therein becoming suddenly 
disengaged from the “profane” world of labor, reason, and discourse, is nothing but this oceanic 
torrent of lightness in whose high tide of consumption the subject is awash: “For the subject is 
consumption insofar as it is not tied down to work” (AS I 58, original emphasis).  The Bataillean 
subject, as such, is the contagion of “communication,” and its essential epistemological gesture is 
to fall into the excess of laughter.  Head thrown back and mouth irrepressibly agape, the subject 
of Bataille’s “impossible thought” is the spitting image of impropriety: a subject which is, in a 
sense, nothing but the sputtering opening of a mouth that insists on itself (i.e., its opening), a 
subject vehemently exposing its own excesses like the exuberant parting of lips exhibiting fluids, 
teeth, and tongue.  The subject shaken in the spell of Bataillean thought would thus appear a 
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body bound by alterity, held together by a gesticulating choreography of fragments, an 
unrecognizable voice, full of sound and fury, acousmatically rupturing the soundscape while 
disfiguring the ordered austerity of the face, body and voice doubling over each other in rabid, 
ejaculatory waves that foam over the exorbitantly exposed buccal recesses, signifying nothing.  
“Without any doubt, one who laughs is himself laughable and, in the profound sense, is so more 
than his victim” (IE 97).  And, indeed, the spectacle of Bataillean thought (qua “philosophy of 
laughter”), undoubtedly ridiculous and improper, even “ugly,” may seem to lack any trace of an 
affective threat (in accordance with the Aristotelian model of comedy): that is, this laughing 
subject (of Bataillean thought) ostensibly fails to arouse our more sympathetic sensibilities. 
Bataille’s “philosophy of laughter,” no doubt, results in comedy: in order to 
accommodate the irreconcilable demands of epistemology and expenditure, this method of 
meditation would need to embrace a movement simultaneously limited and unlimited.  This 
comic eventuality, however, is not a fate to which Bataille is blind: the inescapable failure that 
awaits such an intellectual practice cannot have eluded Bataille.  In fact, it is precisely the 
insufficiency of Bataille’s “impossible thought”—the utter failure of Bataille’s articulated 
discourse to complete the task of authenticating the substance of what it claims—that energizes 
this epistemological caprice.  It is through the constitutive inadequacy of the reasoned utterance 
to disclose “the impossible,” to bring “the loss of self” into discursive relief, that that which 
discourse fails to produce flashes before us: “impossible, yet there it is”—a remark not without 
its comic touch (AS III 206, original emphasis).  “Now, to laugh and to be serious at the same 
time is impossible,” Bataille reminds us.  “Laughter is lightness, and we miss it insofar as we 
cease to laugh at it” (S 73).  That Bataille’s discourse on laughter fails, in this sense, reflects the 
ontological insufficiency of the labor of human thought to achieve a consummate state of 
11 
absolute realization.  It is thus in its failure that Bataille’s “impossible thought” succeeds, 
revealing (to us/us to) a moment “where life reaches an impossible limit” (ON 39): namely, 
when, perceiving this failure, we laugh! 
1.3 The Hybridity of Elementary Forms 
My argument, if I may rehearse once more, is that Bataille enriches the “lived 
experience” of laughter with a certain privilege in identifying it with the operation of his 
epistemology, a privilege which we can now characterize as a privileged affinity with the 
accursed experience eclipsed from the orbit of the dialectical gaze that Bataille calls 
“communication.”  As Latwoo points out, Bataille identifies laughter as the “specific form of 
human interaction” and also as the “fundamental phenomenon of human interattraction” (qt. in 
Latwoo 81).  Laughter’s singularity amongst a range of communicative experiences lies in the 
fact that unlike the many practices, experiences, and events, both ancient and modern, which 
embody the contagious circulation of “communication,” laughter requires no prescribed, 
preemptive sociality.  There need not be the bed of two (or more) consenting bodies, as in 
eroticism, nor need there be the staging of a spectacle—an allotted time and venue, as well as, at 
the very least, a victim, a cleaver, and an executioner—as in ritual sacrifice.4   The requisite 
                                                 
4 The “communication” experienced in the erotic embrace (viz., “compenetration” or “fusion”), for example, 
radiates from the accretion and intensification of two lovers’ mutual resistance to “communication”: erotic tension 
swells towards “the moment of violent contact,” in which the two isolated lovers experience “a feeling of magical 
subversion” (of isolation), through the increasingly violent opposition each lover pits against this moment of fusion 
(G 129).  This gesture of resistance corresponds precisely to the negative action (i.e., labor) by which the individual 
posits and maintains her isolation by opposing the excess and immediacy of death.  Erotic fusion occurs the moment 
in which the intensity of contact, spurred by the growing ferocity of resistance, mutually overwhelms the boundaries 
of each lovers’ discontinuous existence.  The intrigue of each lover’s respective will is reciprocally flooded by a 
contagion that exhausts it.  Thus two fuse into a heterogeneous one through a delirium of requited lacerations, a 
coincidence of violent caresses in which each lover lacerates the “discontinuity” of the other and in which each is, 
thereby, lacerated: “The point at which the lovers meet is the delirium of lacerating and being lacerated” (G 142).  
But resistance is not exhausted entirely, or at least if it is, then fusion eventually devolves into inertia.  For fusion 
“demands heterogeneity” and, therefore, refers only to the moment of passage (“the opposite of a state”) wherein 
“two torrents mix together with a roar” (G 129). 
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mise-en-scène of sacrifice—and the trace of intent that such structuralizing stage-setting 
invariably entails—is precisely what is missing from the occasion of laughter’s burst(s).5   No 
necessary intentionality nor initiating realization of difference is required prior to the casting of 
laughter’s spell.  In fact, laughter’s premier precondition is the absence of an anticipatory 
context.  In Inner Experience, Bataille identifies laughter as a privileged expression of a sudden 
apperception of chance, relativity, and randomness: 
Laughter arises from differences in level, from depressions suddenly provoked.  If 
I pull the rug out from under . . . the sufficiency of a solemn figure is followed by 
the revelation of an ultimate insufficiency . . . I am made happy, no matter what, 
by failure experienced.  (IE 89) 
 
Laughter radiates from an unforeseen exposure to the relativity of “being,” an abrupt unmasking 
of finitude bespeaking the “failure” of “project” and of all our fear and loathing about the future.  
It is a cachinnating expression issuing from an uncalculated, contingent brush with the 
ontological insufficiency of “being” which lies “[a]t the basis of human life,” and from which 
“[m]an cannot, by any means, escape” (VE 172; IE 91).  Laughing, I fall swiftly into an 
unanticipated suspension of the historical weight of self-consciousness, suddenly sprung from 
the expedience of self-intention.  “Intention is abolished in laughter,” confirms Jean-Luc Nancy, 
“it explodes there, and the pieces into which it bursts are what laughter laughs—laughter, in 
which there is always more than one laugh” (“Laughter, Presence” 384).  As Nancy’s articulation 
                                                 
5 Similar to the scenario of erotic fusion, the spectacle of sacrifice, through which an isolated being comes in self-
irruptive contact with a “beyond” of being(s) via her encounter the death of the other, relies on a structuralizing 
performance of difference, emphasizing “discontinuity” in order that it may be erased.  The spectator of sacrifice 
visually recognizes her “discontinuity,” for example, through the unambiguous hierarchy embodied in the image of 
the priest with blade in hand standing over the restrained victim.  Caravaggio’s painting The Sacrifice of Isaac 
(1603), which depicts the precise moment of the angel’s intervention in the biblical story of Abraham’s sacrifice of 
Isaac, lays bare this initiating inequality constitutive to the drama of sacrifice by highlighting Abraham’s domination 
of Isaac as well as Isaac’s helplessness and terror.  In ritual practice, both the sacrificer and the spectators obtain a 
heightened awareness of their separate existence by virtue of their recognition of the victim as “other.”  Sacrifice 
demands this specific, predetermined social context, for the ritual “communication of anguish” (qua sacrifice) 
ultimately issues from an annulment of the difference it performatively establishes: “[T]here is no sacrifice unless 
the one performing it identifies, in the end, with the victim.  Unless this distance is sacrificed as well” (AA 166, 
original emphasis).   
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intimates, the constitutive absence of self-conscious intention out of which laughter bursts lends 
itself to an immanent repetition (of bursts)—“there is always more than one laugh”—from 
which, in the final analysis, a burst of laughter is indissociable. 
This immanent repetition suggests that laughter is a “contagious contagion”: the 
“contagion”—i.e., the “unforeseen transparency from one to the other” that flares up between 
two beings who share a laugh “as if the same laugh gave rise to a single inner torrent”—becomes 
“contagious” in the sense that this wave of hilarity gives shape to a laughable spectacle whereby 
the entangled spontaneity of two beings’ shared tide of joy may catch in its contagion a cluster of 
other beings who witness it (G 130; AS III 242).  Thus Bataille writes, “If there is a contagious 
contagion, it is because an element of the spectacle is of the same nature as its repercussion” (G 
130, original emphasis).  In this way, laughter sonorously hybridizes the two “elementary forms” 
of “communication” that Bataille identifies in erotic “fusion” (i.e., “[c]ommunication linking two 
beings”) and in the “spectacle” of sacrifice (i.e., “[c]ommunication, through death, with a 
beyond”): “The passage of the laughter from two people to several people (or one person) 
introduces into the interior of the realm of laughter the difference that generally separates the 
realm of eroticism and that of sacrifice” (G 129, original emphasis).  Fusion, which finds its 
characteristic embodiment in eroticism, occurs only in the moment in which the feature of 
passage is in play between two hitherto discontinuous beings, referring to “the moment when the 
waters mix together, the slipping of one into the other,” viz., the moment in which the 
“discontinuity” of both beings is mutually violated: “Fusion introduces another existence in me 
(it introduces this other in me as mine, and at the same time as other)” (G 129, original 
emphases).  Latwoo extrapolates from this passage “an affective locus of both dissolution and 
emergence of the subject, of being oneself while becoming someone other” (81, original 
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emphasis).  In the evental instant of a burst of laughter shared between two beings, these beings 
undergo such an acute moment of mutually paradoxical self-strangeness, in which the “birth” of 
the heterogeneous “subject” emergent in “communication” effectively coincides with the “death” 
of the two isolated, discursive subjects.  And this “impossible” coincidence of “birth” and 
“death” may thus constitute a spectacle for another being who either sees or hears these two 
beings fall into the carnival disorder of laughter.  Touched by the contagion, this other would 
then “participate in [this] emotion from inside [herself],” and this other’s fall into laughter 
reciprocates a spectacle that renews the laughers’ laughter and evokes the “compenetration” of 
them all (qt. in Latwoo 75).  This “sovereign” dynamism of a burst of laughter is reducible to its 
obliteration of anticipatory intent and theoretically suggests that laughter carries the orgiastic 
potential to carry on ad infinitum.          
Indeed, much like other “sovereign moments” of communicative experience, most 
notably sacrifice and eroticism, the “lived experience” of laughter entails the subject’s slippage 
from the known back into the unknown (G 129).  And yet, only in laughter does “consciousness 
intervene just as suddenly,” an observation Pierre Klossowski extrapolates from what I have 
identified as Bataille’s “impossible thought”: “to laugh is to think” (153).  It is as though the 
recognition of difference, which prefaces and makes possible both sacrifice and erotic effusion, 
were condensed into the same movement—the same moment—as the erasure of difference 
through which “communication” occurs.  If we take Klossowski’s observation one step further, 
taking into account the immanent repetition of laughter’s burst(s) to which the lack of 
anticipatory intent gives rise, we might posit that insofar as consciousness “intervenes just as 
suddenly” as laughter bursts it into peals and pieces, laughter also bursts consciousness back into 
pieces “just as suddenly” as consciousness intervenes—or had intervened—upon its (initial) 
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risible rupture.  As such, laughter is a cachinnating dance into and out of a dislocation of the 
mediated system of dialectical consciousness that determines the habitual, historical register of 
self-consciousness (qua “clear consciousness”) (TR 56).  Or, rather, laughter suspends dialectical 
consciousness at the limit between its realization and loss.  It is this richly paradoxical relation to 
“clear consciousness” that gives laughter its singular identification with the movement of 
“communication” as the theatre in which Bataille seeks to conflate this accursed movement of 
experience with the operation of epistemology itself.   
1.4 Tragic Reverberations 
Let us go then, you and I, into the formless domain of Bataille’s “impossible thought.”  
But let us first heed the admonition regarding our critical investment in Bataille’s “philosophy of 
laughter” that Stuart Kendall offers in his critical biography of Bataille: Kendall alerts us to the 
potentially reductive trap of letting Bataille’s frequent appeals to the experience of laughter “lead 
us to confine his entire thought or experience to the realm of laughter, even its foundational 
impulse” (GB 33).  The feature most important to Bataille’s intoxication with this experience, 
according to Kendall, is its “capacity for reversal”—a capacity that Lucio Angelo Privitello 
contends is an “infinite capacity”—namely, its capacity to collapse the discursive limits that 
experientially separate, for example, repulsion and horror from attraction and ecstasy (GB 33; 
179). 
Kendall’s warning is especially pertinent when taken in tandem with Bataille’s work on 
eroticism, specifically the way in which erotic experience facilitates the interaction of prohibition 
and transgression in order to illuminate the effusive intimacy of life and death.  As Bataille 
points out in the “Preface” to Madame Edwarda, laughter “accentuates the pleasure – pain 
opposition . . . , [and] also underscores their fundamental kinship” (ME 224).  Though this 
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accentuation is not uncommon to erotic experience, the perceived gaiety and lightness of 
laughter risks transforming the principle of prohibition, “of necessary and mandatory decencies,” 
“into iron-clad hypocrisy, into a lack of understanding or an unwillingness to understand what is 
involved” (ME 224).  As Foucault explains, transgression does not disavow the seriousness of 
the limit imposed by the interdiction, nor does it preexists the limit any more than the limit could 
exists without bringing with it the possibility of being transgressed.  Furthermore, transgression 
does not irredeemably eradicate the limit, but rather involves a necessary play upon crossing the 
limit and re-crossing itself towards the horizon of the limit: 
The limit and transgression depend on each other for whatever density of being 
they possess: a limit could not exist if it were absolutely uncrossable, and, 
reciprocally, transgression would be pointless if it merely crossed a limit 
composed of illusions and shadows.  (27) 
 
The “sacred” emanation that proceeds from transgression must necessarily avoid obliterating the 
limit entirely: to do so would broach a regression to the undifferentiated slime of “pure 
animality,” and such a regression forgoes the possibility of the sacred (AS II 92).  Thus, the 
sacred violence of transgression, though it gives “free play to the impulses . . . refuse[d] during 
profane times,” actually “guards the rigor of the prohibition” rather than doing away with it, just 
as, reciprocally, the prohibition “guards the possibility of transgression” (AS II 90; AS III 340).  
Moreover, the greater the transgression’s extravagance, the greater stringency and authority it 
bestows upon the prohibition it violates; correspondingly, the greater the prohibition’s rigidity, 
the greater the bloodlust of the transgression that razes it. 
 When we infer only pure joviality from laughter and, thereafter, assume such an 
experience to epitomize the “foundational impulse” of Bataille’s thought (or even its entire 
movement and complexity), we risk trivializing the very real risks involved in Bataille’s 
thinking.  We risk neglecting the gravity and violence of the erotic encounter with the limit 
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without which we would lack the epistemological latitude of levying experience against “the 
extreme limit of the ‘possible’” (IE 42).  In other words, if we’re not careful, if we’re not 
rigorous in our allegiance to the “awakening of thought” experienced in a burst of laughter, 
laughter might become a compensatory measure or compulsory aversion to “the underlying truth 
of eroticism,” which is “an assenting to life up to the point of death” (ME 224; E 11).  And yet, 
Kendall’s reduction of Bataillean laughter to a mere mechanism of reversal neglects to 
appreciate the deeply tragic interpretation of ontological finitude from which Bataillean laughter 
emanates.  Indeed, aside from the caveat he delivers in the “Preface” to Madame Edwarda, 
Bataille adamantly reminds us that the joyousness experienced in a burst of laughter “cannot be 
separated from a tragic feeling” (NLT 142).  Bataille exemplifies this notion of a tragic 
counterpart to laughter with repeated appeals to its identification with tears.  As Bataille writes in 
Literature and Evil (1957), emphasizing the synergy of laughter and tears, “If we laugh or if we 
cry it is because, as victims of a game or depositories of a secret, death momentarily appears 
light to us.  That does not mean that it has lost its horror: it simply means that for an instant we 
have risen above it” (LE 68).  Cracking open the worst—the death that awaits us all and that 
fuels all our labor, fear and loathing—with lightness, laughter “draws a heightened 
consciousness of being”: it exposes, for example, the wise man’s flight from the ravages of death 
as but a pale effort to preserve life, as a shrinking back or cowering away from the “intimacy” of 
human life, reason itself being governed by a central aversion to the blinding radiation of those 
precipitate and contagious movements of “communication” that endanger the preservation of life 
but liberate the living of it (LE 68).  We must, therefore, take into account that, for Bataille, 
laughter always involves the most excessive, “accursed” domain of experience; it is always an 
expression of “joy before death” (VE 235).    
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2    THE REPETITION OF INTIMATE NOISE 
No limit to laughter if it is violent enough. 
   —Bataille, Guilty (1944) 
2.1 The Impossible Divinity of Laughter 
“To see tragic characters founder and to be able to laugh, despite the profound 
understanding, emotion and sympathy we feel: this is divine” (Nietzsche, WP 585, original 
emphasis).  This, the divine dithyramb of the elevating spirit, becomes a modus operandi for 
Bataille, one of Nietzsche’s most radical twentieth century disciples.6  What is “divine” for 
Bataille is “man . . . in the experience of his limits”: “God is not the limit of man, but the limit of 
man is divine” (G 93).  Nietzsche’s invocation of the “divine” as a laugh that disrupts the pity 
provoked by the pain of anthropomorphisms, silencing the sympathies solicited by tragic 
spectacles—a burst of joy in spite of the spectacle dramatizing “the horror and absurdity of 
existence”—announces the perspectival possibility of human emancipation from the “profane” 
world of “discontinuity,” duration, and determinable objects (BT 7).  The “divinity” that 
Nietzsche finds in tragic laughter, rejoicing in defiance of the worldly misery one encounters in 
the spectacle of the other’s misfortune, strongly informs Bataille’s appreciation for the “divine” 
freedom of a “sovereign” laugh that not only “physically lacerate[s] the physis,” but also 
liberates the subject, however briefly, from the pool of human woes: “Laughter denies not only 
nature, in which man is entangled, but human misery, in which most men are still entangled” (G 
123, original emphasis, 103).  Unlike smiling, which many contemporary ethologists have 
identified amongst non-humans animals as a spontaneous extension of fear responses (i.e., in 
                                                 
6 Bataille cites this passage in a number of texts that span across his entire theoretical career.  See NL 22, ON xxxiii, 
NLT 143.   
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order to visually demonstrate submissiveness towards the other7), laughter discharges a 
constellation of material convulsions whose epileptic bodily flutters and accompanying acoustic 
spasms radically contradict the given soundscape and instinctual economy of gestural 
immanence characteristic of the “natural” world of animality, where each being is intrinsically 
self-identical with the other and, to some extent, undistinguished from the environment through 
which it moves (“every animal is in the world like water in water”) (TR 19, original emphasis).  
Simultaneous to its vehement contestation of the ahistorical immanence of nature, laughter 
swiftly subverts the measured economy of labor and discourse which constitutes the habitual, 
historical register of human consciousness (viz., “clear consciousness”) and which, 
notwithstanding the latter’s panoptic optimism for the future, rests at the root of “human 
misery”: for insofar as “clear consciousness” posits the individual subject’s productive labor and 
self-preservation as the basic conditions of her worth, it ties the value of human life to a 
prohibition of the jouissance of “an existence without delay” (IE 47). 
In proper Nietzschean fashion, Bataille makes laughter—aside from obligatory, feigned, 
or “complacent” laughter—a matter of strength, of the wherewithal to overcome the anguish one 
feels in encountering (the image of) one’s own ontological finitude: “The most timid laughter 
absorbs an infinite weakness” (ON 58; G 87).  Bataille illustrates this point by juxtaposing the 
image of a woman who trips and falls on the street to the image of a woman who throws herself 
from an apartment window to a grisly, crushing death (IE 192).  The unfortunate fall of the 
woman crossing the street may (or may not, depending on our compulsive strength at that 
moment) instigate the laughter of those of us who witness her fall; however, the spectacle of a 
woman hurling herself into the void before our very eyes, drowning the sidewalk at our feet with 
                                                 
7 See Preuschoft, Signe, “‘Laughter’ and ‘Smile’ in Barbary Macaques (Macaca Sylvanus),” Ethology 91.3 (1992): 
220-36. 
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a most human gore, would certainly not arouse our laughter.  Witness to the overwhelming 
horror of “being,” we would experience anguish.8  The limits of tolerance in the face of the void 
can also apply to the former scenario of the falling pedestrian “as soon as you feel the bonds of 
solidarity which unite you with the victim,” for example, if you share with the falling other “the 
bonds of a particular affection” (IE 192).  If the hypothetical klutz who chews the pavement 
happens to be my grandmother, I would be less inclined to respond joyously, and, indeed, would 
be more likely to express concern, if not the full-fledged anguish of witnessing the other’s 
sudden death. 
But Bataille is not offering moral advice: he is not claiming that you should not laugh at 
the other’s suicidal plunge from the window.  After all, “we were [all] told, as children, ‘there is 
nothing to laugh at’” when we witness the pedestrian’s fall, and yet, as Bataille insists, we have 
all laughed at such a spectacle at some point in our lives (S 68).  In Bataille’s view, the fact that 
one does not laugh when one witnesses the spectacle of another’s “absolute dismemberment” 
extends not from a sense of moral solemnity, social obligation, or even legitimate concern (HDS 
291).  Rather, abhorrent as it may sound from a socially conscious point of view, our inability to 
                                                 
8 What Bataille calls “anguish” is a sensation akin to a feeling of vertigo, “where fear does not paralyze but 
increases an involuntary desire to fall” (AS II 100).  Anguish is the fear of death mixed with a furtive desire to be 
consumed by its excess.  It thereby discloses the secret of human desire: “[W]hat we want is what uses up our 
strength and our resources and, if necessary, places our life in danger” (AS II 104).  Lacking the intoxicating aroma 
of decay, an object fails to arouse our desire, for it is human “sexuality’s fragrance of death” that eroticizes desire 
and, thereby, differentiates human sexuality from the immanent avidity of animals: “This is the meaning of anguish, 
without which sexuality would only be an animal activity, and would not be erotic” (AS II 100, original emphasis).  
Phaedra’s passion for Hippolytus, her step-son, causes her anguish insofar as its criminal nature saturates desire with 
a scent of the cadaverous surplus of life whose exclusion guarantees the sustainability of the social order and the 
preservation of the socialized, differentiated human subject.  And yet, though the forbidden character of Phaedra’s 
desire horrifies her, the intensity of her adversity to the virulent movement of death (qua the surplus of life) 
surreptitiously piques the flame of her ardor: “The more difficult the horror is to bear, the more desirable it is,” for, 
again, “the object we desire most is in principle the one most likely to endanger or destroy us” (AS II 97, 104).  The 
fever of erotic passion, so intimately bound to ruination (of oneself and of the other), cannot absolve itself of the 
anguishing cocktail of fear and desire in the face of annihilation any more than the spectacle of sacrificial cruelty in 
which the spectator beholds “the image of [her] own death” as death opens the throat of the other, “sacrifice being 
the communication of anguish (as laughter is the communication of its dispersion)” (HDS 286; S 73, original 
emphasis). 
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laugh at the other’s suicide, as Bataille would have it, stems from human weakness, from an 
incapacity to conquer the gravity of our anguish.  In general, Bataille theorizes that the scenario 
involving one’s laughing in response to one’s sudden exposure to the paucity of “being” betrayed 
by the spectacle of the other’s misfortune—if only this “inner experience” could only be 
sustained—empowers one with the impression of “becom[ing] a god,” a conviction that clearly 
resonates with Nietzsche’s characterization of the “divine” as laughing in response to the tragic 
tableau (S 72).  Should one (impossibly) manage to laugh at the spectacle of the other’s suicide, 
one would, no doubt, commit among the gravest of morally reprehensible and socially repulsive 
offenses, laughing an act of unspeakable violence, comparable to a medieval European laughing 
at Holy Communion.  But what Nietzsche’s laughter affirms as “divine” is the experience of “the 
impossible,” the experience of becoming other than one’s recognizably human self via the 
sudden loss or estrangement of those all-too-recognizably-human conventions of valuation that 
presuppose appropriate affective responses to certain categories of “lived experience” and, as 
such, humanize us by arranging our experience according to a predictable trajectory of the self’s 
relation to the other.  The truly “divine” laughter would be the laughter that laughs at that for 
which it is impossible for socialized humans to laugh.  It is a necessarily puerile laughter, for 
only one who has yet to accede to anthropomorphic prominence, who has yet to achieve a 
recognizable degree of self-reliance or self-conscious autonomy and thus yet to develop a 
consummate faith in (the illusion of) her own self-sufficiency, could mistake such a viscerally 
tragic revelation of finitude for a joke.  For though there are many here among us who feel that 
life is but a joke, there are few who feel the humorous side of suicide.  The divinity of laughter, 
however, suggests a total identification of the laughable and the tragic, a pathological divinity 
laughing “a perfect laughter: the laughter that doesn’t laugh” (AS III 439). 
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With regards to the scene of the falling pedestrian, laughter requires the laugher’s 
indifference to the welfare of the other at whom she laughs.  Lacking this germ of insouciance, 
this kernel of coldness or contempt for the other, the subject who laughs may be compelled to 
perceive the precariousness of her own fragile situation in the other’s fall from apparent self-
sufficiency.  A child who witnesses an adult’s fall may, indeed, fall into revelry, for the spectacle 
of the falling adult, whose habitual austerity and ostensible self-sufficiency tirelessly menace the 
clownishly clumsy child, unexpectedly parades before the child an image of authority brought 
low.  The unintentionally recumbent posture of the fallen adult suggests a return to the “despised 
bestiality” out of which humans, in achieving relative verticality, arise and, therein, consummate 
a “decisive reversal of animal existence” which the child is still in the developmental process of 
mastering (AS II 91, my emphasis; VE 89).  The adult’s fall suggests a regression towards the 
horizontality of animal being, which humans endure only in sleep, in erotic couplings, and in 
death (though death be not endured), and it is the child’s sudden exposure to the spectacle of this 
regression, contrasted by the fact that she remains upright, that makes her laugh.  If, however, the 
fall one were to witness was the other’s fall to her death, one has nothing to “profit” from 
laughing (though perhaps we cannot put it past the child not to laugh a chilling, horrified laugh): 
the other’s humiliation which would bestow a sense of “sudden glory” upon the laugher—insofar 
as she is the one who maintains the illusion of sufficiency—would be impossible.9 
                                                 
9 The notion of “sudden glory” comes from Thomas Hobbes.  Hobbes was writing in the tradition outlined by the 
Aristotelian comedic mask, whereby the presentation of the mask—something “ugly” yet “harmless”—incites the 
risible response, an expression of the laughing subject’s self-perceived “superiority” in relation to the ignominy of 
the buffoon.  The Aristotelian archetype calibrates the philosopher’s gaze by focalizing on a distinct object— 
extraneous to the laugher and to laughter—as the caustic fuse of laughter.  Consistent with Aristotelian comedy, 
Hobbes argued that the appearance of a “deformed thing” awards a sense of “sudden glory” unto the subject who 
beholds such vulgarities (47).  The experience of this “sudden glory” is precisely what laughter expresses as such.  
Laughter is a sonorous manifestation of “the conception of some eminency in ourselves, by comparison with the 
infirmity of others, or with our own formerly” (19).  
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The scene of the other’s suicide designates the “impossibility” of laughter not because 
this bloody spectacle fails to betray a “central insufficiency,” not because it fails to expose us to 
our finitude, but because such a lurid exhibition of death is something towards which it is 
impossible for socialized beings to experience indifference (VE 176).  Like the spectator of 
sacrifice, who must always, in the end, identify with the victim struck dead, she who witnesses 
the other’s self-annihilation trembles before the monstrous manifestation of her own “link to 
annihilation,” struck dumb with eyes and mouth agape (HDS 293).  The being who would laugh 
at the spectacle of the other’s suicide is, therefore, not quite (recognizably) human—or, better 
yet, not in the slightest.  Only a dead man could laugh amidst the throes of the intolerable pitch 
of horror that would beset the witness of the other’s sinister self-annihilation (only, strictly 
speaking, of course, the dead don’t laugh).  Ultimately, laughing at the other’s misfortune always 
entails the laugher’s compulsive consenting to a loss (of face, stability, seriousness, dignity, etc.) 
that is relatively commensurate to the loss betrayed by the other: “In the consent to loss, as in the 
loss itself, a given proportion of profit to loss must be observed.  If loss be excessive or profit 
either nonexistent or too small, anguish is not dispelled; acceptance of loss is then impossible” (S 
70).  To laugh amid the suicidal scenario would require the laugher’s indifference or “consent” to 
his own annihilation, an indifference that disqualifies him, in advance, from the symbolic arena 
of human socialization and individualization.  For humans become individuals and preserve the 
glass shell of individuality only by virtue of the fear of death that yokes them to the society of 
labor and calculated results.  To laugh at suicide is thus suicidal; it entails the shattering of that 
glass house of the ego, relinquishing it unreservedly to the intimate noise of death, to the 
brilliance of a sound as impossible as a crystal palace smashed by lightning.  In short, death 
cannot be a matter of indifference to the individual.  He who laughs at the other’s total 
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annihilation is thereby already exiled from the throng of hard-working, upstanding, bona fide 
individuals.  Or, rather, such “impossible” mirth marks the emergence of a going beyond what 
the human order is capable of processing or recognizing as internal to its functioning, a going 
beyond which also manifests a falling short of the “presence” of the human in propria.  Such 
“impossible” laughter, as such, manifests the mark of monsters.    
A singular trait, for instance, that unites nearly all modern, Western representations of the 
“supervillain” archetype, from whose despotic grip the helpless human order must be 
interminably saved, is the characteristic “maniacal laugh,” a harrowing explosion of mirth 
epitomized in the character of the Joker from the Batman series.  Cackling maniacally at the 
hecatomb the world has become at his behest, the Joker does not possess the full criteria for 
membership in the human order nor for participation in the “project” of constructing and 
preserving an ordered future for humanity.  His terroristic allegiance to anarchy and consequent 
assault upon the homeostasis of human society and upon the future it imagines for itself is 
inherently self-destructive, and his mad hilarity only confirms that he is entirely unfit for the 
productive society of human labors and law-abiding, taxpaying citizenship.  The Joker’s 
mutinous, ungovernable laughter, echoing even as he falls deathward from a high-rise building 
(only to be caught by Batman) in Christopher Nolan’s 2008 film, The Dark Knight, is either too 
little or too much to be absorbed into the meaningful economy of purposive human activity.  
This irrepressible laughter, excessive to the point of self-destruction, exposes laughter as a 
convulsive locus of loss, as the unleashing of a symbolic surplus which threatens the operative 
stability and homogeneous hum of civilized human life, and which, incidentally, lends the 
character of the Joker his imprimatur of attraction.  For, notwithstanding the inhumanity and 
violence of the Joker’s “impossible” laughter, laughter is never more nor less than a sign of 
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human passion: “Man,” says Aristotle in Parts of Animals, is “the animal who laughs” (III 10).  
Passion is in itself excessive: it flares up at the limits of our self-preservative impulses.  By no 
accident is the Western literary and cinematic canon—from Helen and Paris to Winston and 
Julia—saturated with installation after installation dramatizing the ruinous risks of human 
passion.  But laughter makes light of passionate risk, bursting at the limit of the human and the 
non-human “divine” as it breezily cedes to a passion that jeopardizes life in duration.  Charles 
Baudelaire, in his essay “The Essence of Laughter,” captures the ambiguous character of this 
passion apropos of (in)humanity and divinity in identifying laughter as “satanic” yet “profoundly 
human” (149). 
On the one hand, by dint of being a phenomenon peculiar to humans, laughter must 
necessarily indicate, if not express, the finitude from which no mortal may escape, the 
insufficiency which steeps us in our common misery.  As such, laughter is not a trivialization or 
evasion of the tragic weight of human finitude.  But laughter is also a compulsive refusal to 
experience the reality of finite existence as such.  It entails a recognition of finitude in all its 
heaviness and yet compulsively refuses to abide the tragic temperament that the revelation of 
finite being conventionally instills in the apprehensive foreground of consciousness.  Peals of 
laughter, in short, refuse to capitulate to the gravity of finitude.  If all laughter can ultimately be 
reduced, in some way, to laughing at oneself and at one’s finitude, then when one laughs, one 
rejoices in spite of the anguishing revelation that the order of things (and the “salvation” this 
order promises) hangs but on the hooks of chance.  I rejoice, that is, in spite of the revelation that 
the symbolically-organized grid that subtends my survival (as a discrete subject) as well as the 
future possibility of my self-conscious freedom is, in the final instance, entirely at the disposal of 
accidents.  Thus, insofar as laughter celebrates the sudden exposure of a nothingness to which 
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finite existence is inescapably sentenced, joyously affirming the all-too-human horror of “being,” 
laughter also traverses the limitations of the latter (i.e., the horror of “being”) in divine revolt 
against the tragic weight anchored onto the meaninglessness of finite existence and against the 
impotence of language and “clear consciousness” to harness this meaninglessness in the lucidity 
of discursive form. 
Eventually, Bataille even posits “a fundamental accord between our joy and an impulse to 
self-destruction,” suggesting a congruence between the “lived experience” of laughter and what, 
in psychoanalytic discourse, we know as the death drive (to which all drives ultimately refer) (S 
70).  “When you laugh,” Bataille asserts, “you perceive yourself to be the accomplice of a 
destruction of what you are” (IE 192).  When the subject’s ontological insufficiency suddenly 
becomes “externally manifest,” she experiences either anguish (as in sacrifice) or the lifting of 
anguish in a compulsive burst of joy in the face of death (IE 89).  Which affectation takes hold 
depends upon the intensity of the subject’s contact or confrontation with the nauseating void of 
“being,” as well as on her strength, on her compulsive capacity to conquer her anguish by 
rendering herself complicit in her own annihilation, or, in short, on her capacity to make light of 
(her own) finitude, to make merry in the face of death.  Thus, in its identification with laughter’s 
bursting, Bataillean thought (qua “philosophy of laughter”) violently strives to turn the 
anguishing gravity of this sudden revelation—that, as a finite being, I am but “the plaything of 
nothingness”—into its plaything (VE 177). 
2.2 Andronican Automutilation 
And now for something completely different: towards the close of Act 3.1 of 
Shakespeare’s Titus Andronicus, a strange thing occurs.  At this point in the drama, Titus’s 
daughter, Lavinia, has been raped and mutilated, her tongue torn out and both of her arms hacked 
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off; Titus himself has sacrificed his own hand in an effort to free two of his sons from the 
clutches of his fiendish adversaries; and now, in this very moment, Titus receives his own 
dismembered hand returned to him along with the decapitated heads of the sons he had hoped to 
rescue.  Needless to say, Titus has little occasion for joviality—and yet he laughs: 
Marcus: 
Ah, now no more will I control thy griefs; 
Rend off thy silver hair, thy other hand 
Gnawing with thy teeth, and he this dismal sight 
The closing up of our most wretched eyes. 
Now is a time to storm; why are thou still? 
Titus: 
Ha, ha, ha! 
      (3.1.258-263) 
 
What is going on here?  What kind of laughter is this?  How, for example, might an actor 
perform this laugh?  As Manfred Pfister observes, it seems as though no matter how one chooses 
to dramatize it—“long and drawn out or spasmodic, full-throated or stifled, high and thin or deep 
and hollow, excessively gestural or with subdued body language”—this laugh completely 
undermines the gravity and seriousness of the tragic scenario (185).  And yet, when Marcus, 
bewildered by the striking unseemliness of his brother’s laughter, questions Titus about this 
laugh (“Why dost thou laugh? It fits not the hour”), Titus’s response does not fail to suggest that 
something grave may be at play: “Why, I have not another tear to shed” (3.1.264-5).  Pfister 
expounds: 
This is neither a laughter occasioned by some comic stimulus nor a liberating or 
remedial laughter that would help to put [Titus’s] trauma at a distance; neither the 
laughter of superiority nor of Schadenfreude and even less an abundance of vital 
spirits.  It is a laughter beyond, or at the far side of tears, a pathological laughter.  
(185, original emphasis) 
 
Brian Cox, who played Titus in a 1987 production of the play directed by Deborah Warner, 
discusses how the horror that saturates so much of Titus Andronicus is actually enhanced by a 
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“terrible laughter” that balances the play precariously along a “very slender, but strong, tightrope 
of absurdity between comedy and tragedy,” imbuing the drama with an uncanny trace of “the 
absurdity of man’s existence” (qt. in Pfister 185).  No doubt, Titus’s “pathological laughter” 
confounds “orthodox understandings of the registrations of joy and grief” (Steggle 131).  This 
laughter, that is, expresses a consummate hopelessness vis-à-vis the horror of an 
incommensurable reality.  And yet, on the other hand, responding to something irredeemably lost 
to signification, this perverse laugh is also a joyous affirmation of the failure of language, the 
“communication” of incommunicability.  In other words, Titus’s “pathological laughter” 
responds to an intolerable pit of despair which also reverberates in its peals, and at the same 
time, by virtue of its perversely joyous affirmation of the unspeakable depths of the horror of 
“being,” it unleashes a “most radical protest against the horrors of existence” that ring out in its 
peals and against language’s incapacity to render this horror in the clarity of a discursive 
articulation (Pfister 185).  
 If we are to follow Nietzsche’s “divine” imperative, must we laugh at Titus?  
Shakespeare provides us with just such a “divine” laugh in Act 5.1, a scene in which Titus’s 
“pathological laughter,” in a sense, reappears, re-focalized through the retroactive point of view 
of the villainous Aaron as he self-effacingly confesses a misanthropic bloodstorm of gratuitous 
malfeasances to Lucius (Titus’s last living son).  Among the catalogue of “dreadful things” 
committed “[a]s willingly as one would kill a fly” (5.1.141-2) to which he self-sacrificially 
incriminates himself, Aaron confesses to having watched from behind an aperture in a wall as 
Titus looked upon the disembodied heads of his sons—and to laughing: 
I played the cheater for thy father’s hand, 
And when I had it drew myself apart, 
And almost broke my heart with extreme laughter. 
I pried me through the crevice of a wall 
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When for his hand he had his two sons’ heads, 
Beheld his tears, and laughed so heartily 
That both mine eyes were rainy like his;  
And when I told the Empress of this sport 
She swooned almost at my pleasing tale. 
And for my tidings she gave me twenty kisses 
      (5.1.111-19) 
 
Aaron’s is an explicitly criminal laughter, celebrating the imposition of a monstrous violence 
upon the other.  But Aaron’s laughter not only attests to the laugher’s complicity in the 
performance of an act of violence, but rejoices in a sundering of self whereby the subject who 
laughs (at the victim’s expense) falls victim to the very violence that laughter imposes upon the 
fallen other.  So replete is Aaron’s disequilibrium that “he cannot even read the signs that he 
hopes to react against”: his mind glides seamlessly from laughter to weeping to the Empress’s 
erotic swooning, the laughing tears that well up in Aaron’s eyes acting as both lens and cataract 
as they facilitate an identification with his victim even as he misreads Titus’s laughter for 
weeping (Steggle 131).  Moreover, the language with which Aaron describes his taking leave 
after duping Titus into sacrificing his hand echoes Titus’s self-amputation (an act Aaron himself 
actually performs for Titus), heightening Aaron’s identification with the victim of his crimes: “I 
played the cheater for thy father’s hand, / And when I had it drew myself apart, / And almost 
broke my heart with extreme laughter” (5.1.111-12, my emphasis).  Aaron’s “extreme laughter” 
exults in the triumph not of the criminal but of the crime, in the crime made sacred by the 
celebration of its violence over the criminal himself.  This laugh consummates “the pinnacle of 
crime,” “at the peak [where] unlimited denial of others is a denial of oneself” (E 174-5). 
 Such violent extremes of laughter expose the laughing subject to a compulsive, ecstatic 
aberration of individual homogeneity, to a “projection outside the self of a part of oneself” 
whereby inside and outside fuse in an incessant identification between the subject and object of 
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violence (VE 66-8, original emphasis).  The automutilation of Titus’s “pathological laughter” 
and of Aaron’s “extreme laughter” is precisely what is at stake in Bataille’s meditations on 
human joy: 
[G]aiety, connected with the work of death, causes me anguish, and in return, 
exacerbates that anguish: ultimately, gay anguish, anguished gaiety causes me, in 
a feverish chill, ‘absolute dismemberment,’ where it is my joy that finally tears me 
apart (HDS 291, my emphasis). 
 
Laughter “assumes the absence of true anguish,” Bataille explains, “yet it has no other source 
than anguish” (IE 96).  If I laugh at the spectacle of the falling pedestrian’s loss (of face, of 
dignity, of meaning, of stability, of the illusion of human form, etc.), I laugh, in one sense, 
insofar as I escape the other’s fate.  Or, say, as in the example Bataille provides in “Sacrifice,” I 
reach an uncontrollable speed while driving down a mountainside road with some “pretentious 
old lady”—someone “wholly antithetical to the world of intense motion”—in the passenger’s 
seat, and I cry out in joy as she protests to the dangerous speed which is my pleasure (S 70).  In 
either scenario, it is not my anguish being dispelled so much as peals of my laughter shatter the 
possibility of my anguish, specularized through the anguish or distress of the other.  But this 
formulation holds even if we subtract the other from the equation: I may burst into laughter even 
if there is no one in the passenger’s seat as I plunge recklessly down the mountainside.  The 
element that counts, that sends me into a frenzy of joy, is the feeling of groundlessness that stems 
from my engaging in a treacherous behavior to which I am unhabituated and which may 
otherwise provoke my anguish.  Laughing, I am “spasmodically shaken by the idea of the ground 
giving way beneath [my] feet” (VE 177).  Without any trace of anguish, or, rather, its possibility, 
laughter has nothing to scatter: “Obviously, anguish does not release laughter, but anguish in 
some form is necessary: when anguish arises, laughter begins” (S 70, original emphasis).  In 
laughter, we find the advent of anguish bursting into its immediate evacuation, an emergent 
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sensation of intolerable fear mingled with irrepressible desire suddenly encountering its sonorous 
diffusion in a torrent of lightness: “When I laughed, what was communicated to me by the 
laughter of others was the canceling of anguish” (S 73).  But why is it that this “communication” 
of “the canceling of anguish” “tears me apart”?  In order to provide a satisfactory response to this 
question, we must return to laughter’s nullification of self-conscious intention and to the 
immanent repetition that flows forth from this necessarily compulsive nullification.  
2.3 Enjoyment beyond the Pleasure Principle 
Jean Luc-Nancy recognizes the inextricable character of repetition with respect to 
laughter in surmising that there “is never one, never an essence of laughter, nor the laughter of an 
essence” (“Laughter, Presence” 368, original emphasis).  Nancy elaborates: 
[Laughter] bursts only in its own repetition: what, then, is laughter—if it “is”—if 
not repetition?  What it presents (which can consists of a multitude of meanings, 
all possible and actual at the same time) is not presented by signification, but 
somehow purely, immediately—yet as the repetition that it is.  The “burst” of 
laughter is not a single burst, a detached fragment, nor is it the essence of a 
burst—it is the repetition of its bursting—and the bursting of repetition.  (384, my 
emphasis) 
 
How can repetition be immediate?  In short, only in the absence of self-conscious intention.  
Intention is rooted in productive “action” and, thereby, in “discontinuity” and “clear 
consciousness.”  To intend something implies an awareness of a future which one seeks to 
cultivate and toward which one’s action gestures.  Indeed, the self-conscious subject’s 
concatenation in linear time cannot be dissociated from intentionality: intention employs the 
subject in incessant temporal assessment, compelling her to engage in constant (re)negotiations 
of moments remembered and moments to come, a forward-backward temporal dialectic through 
which the subject of “clear consciousness” sustains herself (i.e., her isolation) in duration.  And 
the entire scene of intended action(s), where individual subjects not only labor to produce 
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calculably desirable results but where individual subjects come into being as such through this 
labor, is overdetermined by an effort to neutralize anguish (viz., the anguish engendered by our 
originary encounter with death).  “Action,” explains Bataille, “is an effect of anguish and 
suppresses it” (G 81).  Action alienates an “intimacy” that the immediate encounter with 
negativity inspirits, suppressing the “beclouded consciousness” of the anguished mind—a mind 
transfixed with ambivalence, struck by a mortal fear crossed with an overwhelming desire to be 
devoured by what it fears—in favor of the “clear consciousness” whereby the subject secures her 
differentiated identity and durable separation, the principles of profanation (TR 57).  “Profane 
life,” the domain of acquisition and duration wherein isolated subjects practice self-preservation 
in the production and conservation of material and ideational commodities, requires the quelling 
of intimate passions in order that they may be replaced with “the thing that the individual is in 
the society of labor” (AS II 90; TR 47, my emphasis).  The intentionality subtending the 
dispassionate arena of the “I” voluntarily compromises the unreserved fury of “intimate life” in 
favor of a life of discontinuity and duration secured through labor and the lucidity of discourse.10 
                                                 
10 Hence Bataille’s insistent relegation of self-conscious knowledge to a form of enslavement: “I think that 
knowledge enslaves us, that at the base of all knowledge there is servility, the acceptation of a way of life wherein 
each moment has meaning only in relation to another or others that will follow it” (NR 129).  The active suppression 
of anguish through material and intellectual labor amounts to a process of sublimation, a distillation of desire from 
the fear of death, making possible the objective acquisition of knowledge by virtue of disentangling the 
contradictory impulses that combine to form the morbid delectation of anguish.  Or, rather, the active suppression of 
anguish obeys a logic of castration: it gives the lie to our “profane” faith in the hygienic distance between subject 
and object and, thus, enfranchises the possibility of objective knowledge and truth by ensuring the separation of the 
knowing subject, vaccinated from contaminating contact with the venereal object - (m)other.  As such, the objective 
world, the historical world of self-conscious knowledge and self-identification organized by the penetrating drift of 
the signifier, the socio-symbolic world of interpellation, is a world of suppressed anguish.  Consequently, the 
“profane” sphere in which “I” come into being, the sphere inhabited by the discrete subject’s thriving and surviving, 
is a world in which anguish must always be a priori.  Anguish—the fear of death mingled with the clandestine 
desire to abandon oneself to its yawning abyss—is the emotive precondition of the I’s articulation: if “I” come into 
being via the suppression of anguish effectuated by the exercise(s) of discourse, reason, and work, then my 
differential existence is a contingency of suppressed anguish.  Anguish thus constitutes the formative condition of 
the “I”: it is precisely in the encounter with the anguish of negativity, for instance, that the exigence of Hegelian 
phenomenology derives its imperative to develop a philosophy of the work of dialectical self-consciousness.  In the 
master-slave dialectic, it is the slave’s self-conscious intentionality, his conservative denial of the will to risk 
annihilation—a suppression of anguish—that sets him on the dialectical path towards “absolute knowing.” 
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 Meanwhile, in compulsively casting aside the coming of anguish and in abolishing 
intention, laughter repeatedly shatters the possibility by which productive realities are realized.  
Laughter unexpectedly releases its subject from whatever “profane” neuroses preoccupy her 
mind in the moment(s) preceding the moment of its bursting.  Without warning and without 
restraint, laughter relinquishes the historical pathologies of “clear consciousness” along with the 
anxiety and anticipation that accompany the constraints of historical self-consciousness.  
Laughing, we involuntarily bail out on the cult of reason and the laborious force of its despotic 
logic.  As such, laughter is a compulsive emancipation from the restrictive morality of historical 
self-consciousness and tradition, a necessarily involuntary abandonment of that hallowed spirit 
“for which patriots and parents have lived and died” (Kimmel 178).  It is a bursting coincidence 
of necessity and freedom, a “wonder-struck” explosion of “the interstices between freedom and 
compulsion” (TR 46; Kimmel 183).  A cachinnating “repetition compulsion,” laughter 
celebrates, repeatedly in its peals, the phenomenological project’s foreclosure in advance.  A 
burst of laughter is a material manifestation of the death drive denied by every step in the 
phenomenological march towards a self-conscious escape from the nightmare of history.  It 
unexpectedly materializes a phenomenological surplus and, in its compulsive repetition, attests 
to this surplus as that which, by way of its impossibility or exclusion, is essential to the 
phenomenological organization of historical self-consciousness and as that which, at the same 
time, devastates the system to which it lends possibility from within.  Laughter illuminates the 
“impossible” night preceding and exceeding the diurnal presence of “clear consciousness,” an 
unanticipated, exuberant revelation of the drive that the revelations of dialectical thought labor to 
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destroy.11  Bataillean thought’s epistemological identification with the epistemological ruination 
of the drive insists on a mode of thinking that endangers the subject of the stable, human order, 
but which gestures towards a liberation of thought from the conservative, utilitarian demands of 
reason in the very experience of self-risking (qua thought).    
 Ultimately, though the apperception of some form of “profit,” some kind of awareness of 
one’s “superiority” in relation to the fallen other, is in some ways necessary for laughter to arise 
amidst the scene of the other’s fall, this awareness can no longer operate as such once laughter 
escalates to a “giddy intensity” (S 71).  The laughing subject “ceases to feel more serious than 
the objects of his laughter” (S 72).  Hence, “Laughter has the quality of provoking laughter” (S 
69).  Even if one “arrives late” to the spectacle of impropriety or error that provoked an initial 
burst, one may nevertheless become entangled in the communal spontaneity of shared laughter.  
Moreover, the sudden sense of “divine” glory awarded the subject who maintains her erect 
posture in the face of the other’s fall can no longer be taken seriously by others nor by the 
laughing subject herself, for she has become nothing but the vehicle for the compulsive 
repetition of loss (e.g., of seriousness, stability, control, etc.).  Only in ceasing to laugh can one 
cease to consider one’s laughter—its “divinity”—a ridiculous, “inferior mode of being” (S 72).  
That laughter should endow a “superior” or “divine” mode of “being” upon the laugher is a 
laughable proposition, for laughter, like the subject caught in its convulsion, is just as much a 
spectacle that spontaneously betrays human finitude as any spectacle of ignominy presumed to 
provoke its initial bursting. 
                                                 
11 Here, I have cribbed, recycled and, admittedly, misappropriated an idea Blanchot posited in relation to literature in 
his classic (anti-)Hegelian essay, “Literature and the Right to Death” (1949).  Blanchot writes: “By turning itself into 
an inability to reveal anything, literature is attempting to become the revelation of what revelation destroys” (328).    
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 The apotheosis of laughter is, rather, a consequence of the fact that when I laugh, I “draw 
myself apart,” tearing myself away from myself in an automutilating movement—“Impalement 
is laughter”—that bursts through me (ON 66).  It is the laceration of the physiological and 
epistemological equilibrium of the laughing subject that lends laughter its “divinity.”  In the 
repetition of bursts, laughter itself—not the subject whom it shakes—celebrates the “divine” 
limit of human possibility, achieving a kind of autonomy from the will of the subject through 
whom it radiates.  Were it not that laughter, once bursting, will continue to burst forth and 
dissipate the coming of my anguish, this anguish may have the effect of paralyzing my frenzy 
and, thereby, through its subsequent suppression, of restoring me to “proper” form, i.e., of 
restoring me to “myself,” as it were.  The “divine” self-estrangement of laughter’s uncontrollable 
burst(s), however, lingers in the fact that the very feeling of imminent anguish that the 
compulsive repetition of laughter disperses derives from a rupture occurring within the laughing 
subject.  If, for example, I burst out laughing in a situation whose solemnity requires that I not 
laugh—say, at a funeral—my awareness of my laughter’s vulgarity, my recognition that my 
laughter violates the limits of ethical standards of behavior prescribed by the given social 
scenario, may cause me to experience an imminent sensation of acute shame, embarrassment, or 
inhibition bordering upon anguish.  And yet, the arrival of this secondary anguish may perpetuate 
my laughter in spite of the intolerably dizzying awareness that I must, without a moment’s 
further delay, suppress my laughter. 
 In “Sacrifice,” Bataille delivers a risible episode that testifies to the automutilating power 
of the repetition of bursts.  Reminiscent of the scene of Titus’s “pathological laughter,” this 
passage describes the “funereal laughter” of a young Englishwoman who has just learned of the 
loss of her loved ones: 
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The young woman’s laughter was, I should think, directed less at the 
deaths announced than at the anguish caused by the idea that she must, at all 
costs, stop laughing, when she was utterly unable to do so.  In the same way an 
actor can, against his will, begin laughing in a way that is intolerable on stage.  
This second anguish, which in stifling laughter intensifies it, is stronger than the 
first.  It may suffice that the young woman at first not wholly realize the 
overwhelming meaning of death.  On perceiving it, she has begun to laugh, and a 
laugh already begun has, even more than a beginning laugh, the power to dispel 
anguish.  (S 70-1) 
 
The inner injunction to stifle one’s laughter and the corresponding effort to do so only condition 
laughter’s continuation and intensification.  Thus truly excessive, uncontrollable laughter 
“increases in proportion to anguish,” becoming more and more excessive and uncontrollable “if 
some dangerous element supervenes and if we laugh even though at all costs we should stop 
laughing” (AS II 101).  As long as some error betraying the finitude of “being” is renewed—in 
this case, laughter itself—laughter may propagate and intensify.  “In laughter, the moment of 
release lies not so much in its beginning as in its increase to the point of a wonderful intensity” 
(S 70).  The violence of laughter lies not so much in the “origin” of laughter’s spell as in its 
repetition, whereby the anguish whose paralyzing vertigo makes action possible galvanizes the 
fury of an intoxication before which the will of the laughing subject becomes effectively 
powerless. 
Take, for example, the scene of a child being tickled by her mother and the laughter that 
reverberates from this disfiguring contact: the physical agitation elicits the raving response that 
ruptures the homogeneity and isolation of the ticklish child thrown into a frenzy by the touch of 
the (m)other.  Meanwhile, the “puerile grimaces” and strange, unintelligible noises the mother 
makes for the child betray a “central insufficiency” which only intensifies the child’s laughter 
insofar as this mask—or, rather, this removal of the mask of sufficiency—intimates the adult’s 
fall from rigid, disciplinary seriousness and austere stability of form (VE 176).  The mother, 
37 
moreover, may increase the intensity of her tickling the more the child laughs, such that the two 
become entangled in a shared, albeit disproportionate, convulsion.  The contact may become so 
acute that it begins to become painful, and, indeed, the limits demarcating suffering from elation 
begin to dissolve, and the closer the child comes to calling out in distress, the more she laughs, 
and thus, the more her mother tickles her. 
If laughing is a “pleasurable” experience, it is the perverse pleasure of going beyond the 
pleasure principle (i.e., the diminution of displeasure), of going recklessly towards a pleasure in 
excess of the principle of homeostatic moderation that insures the coherence and endurance of 
the “I” who thinks (it knows itself).  Laughter, when taken to its emotive extremes, when 
appreciated as the excess that it is, cannot be reconciled with the subject’s self-preservative 
impulses.  Hence, popular and clinical notions of laughter’s restorative qualities, notions which 
posit laughter as a kind of “natural” prophylactic for psychic tension, epitomized by doxa like 
“laughter is the best medicine,” betray a most impoverished understanding of laughter by 
laughably mistaking this insuppressible insurgency upon the stability of the self as a panacea for 
the anxious stimuli that rack this rigid little residue onto which (the) “I” hang(s) for dear human 
life.  For the involuntary, uncontrollable nature of laughter ultimately prevents our deployment 
or remodeling of its conditions and experience so as to accommodate the reasoned demands of 
utilitarianism, whether those demands be in service to a therapeutic agenda or to a corrective, 
sociological project (à la Bergson).  In effect, we lack the strength necessary to alter the 
phenomenon of laughter, comparable to the lack of strength that bars the socialized individual’s 
laughter amid the scene of the other’s suicide: “We can neither eliminate the weight of gravity 
nor modify the conditions under which we laugh” (S 72).  Should some “being” manage to 
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transform the conditions of this laughable phenomenon, “we could no longer quite say of him 
that he is a man – he would then differ as great from man as bird from smoke” (S 72). 
Here Bataille diverges from Nietzsche, the latter having nourished a hope for a 
(superhuman) future that would hold the possibility of a willed laughter.  Bataille realizes that 
laughter is nothing if not a kind of inexplicable, indomitable reflex, and, in contrast to Nietzsche, 
that it can never be anything other than something entirely insubordinate to the reflective 
deliberations of self-conscious intention.  The event-repetition of coming loss, laughter can only 
ever be a liquidation of the practical will and its products.  The paradox of laughter is that it is 
this involuntary loss—this effusive emission of loss discharged without our self-conscious 
consent or deliberation—that, at least in Bataille’s strange universe, is our freedom.  Only in 
blithely shattering self-conscious will, diffusing its ethico-intellectual scruples along with the 
heaviness of the world, do we experience (or approach) autonomy: “Only an insistence on the 
leap, and a nimble lightness (the essence of autonomy and freedom), give laughter its limitless 
dominion” (ON 66).  Only in bursting forth “innocently,” without pretext or motivation, 
indifferent to the future and to the fantasy of coherence and stability it hawks, does laughter 
illuminate, in an incandescent instant, the “divine” summit of finite existence, a momentary 
breach into “the beyond of the specific existence that we are,” a beyond which is, however, 
wholly incompatible with the axis of transcendence: “Autonomy . . . , inaccessible in a finished 
state, completes itself as we renounce ourselves to that state . . . which is to say in the abolition 
of someone who wills it for himself.  It cannot therefore be a state, but a moment (a moment of 
infinite laughter, or of ecstasy . . .)” (ON 55; G 127, original emphases). 
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2.4 The Cruising Community 
Bataille’s effort to fuse the movement of thought with the self-disruptive field of “the 
moment that counts, the moment of rupture, of fissure”—of which “[w]e know nothing 
absolutely”—ultimately gestures towards a “dissolution of every object” of thought as such, the 
objects of thought suddenly becoming, like bubbles in a champagne flute, “no longer anything 
but the occasion of a subjective play” (AS III 202-3, 324).  Striving to transform thought into the 
“lived experience” of a “sovereign moment” that playfully negates the linear, discursive 
unfolding of “the exercise of thought,” Bataille attempts to bring consciousness to a boiling point 
at which it comes into being (i.e., thinks) “impossibly,” “awakening” to a kind of ardent 
objectlessness wherein the anticipation and hope that keep our eyes and ears attuned to the 
progress of the future “dissolve into NOTHING” (AS III 210).  The upshot of this sudden point 
of objectless, epistemological play can perhaps be clarified if we refer it to the capricious 
itinerary of the object of laughter, rather than to the burst itself. 
In contrast to Bergson, who, following Aristotle’s paradigmatic representation of 
comedy, had imagined laughter as a response to an encounter with a necessarily external object 
or spectacle of impropriety that does not risk arousing psychic pain, Bataille reverses the 
conventionally presupposed cause and effect relation between a comic object and a burst of 
laughter.  He problematizes our presumption of a causative link between a comic object and the 
phenomenon of laughter, recognizing that the comic object ultimately assumes its humor (qua 
comic object) from the emotive disposition of those who laugh at it (Trahair 162).  If, for 
example, I witness some other stumble over a crack in the sidewalk, my reaction—whether I step 
over her, help her to her feet, or laugh in her face—will not change the event of her fall as an 
objective fact: neither my indifference, my concern, nor my joy will alter the fact that she fell.  
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And yet, my response may determine the subjective disposition of the experience (both for the 
falling other and for me), which may, in turn, affect, however marginally or significantly, the 
series of events that follow from this encounter.  The point is that the other’s fall only takes on 
the contours of a comic object or event insofar as laughter puts it in play as such: “The comic 
here does not precede laughter,” explains Lisa Trahair, “it is rather an effect of it” (163).   
Perhaps surprisingly, then, Bataille asserts that the heterogeneity that floods the 
“profane” precinct of human consciousness when the gates of laughter fly open actually flows 
from an alterity egressing from “the movement of the comical object” (G 129, my emphasis).  In 
the opening section of Volume III of The Accursed Share, Bataille elaborates: 
It’s not so much that the burst of laughter or tears stops thought.  It’s really the 
object of the laughter, or the object of the tears, that suppresses thought, that takes 
all knowledge away from us. The laughter or the tears break out in the vacuum of 
thought created by their object in the mind.  (AS III 203, original emphases) 
 
The “object” to which Bataille refers here is not exactly an “object” in any conventional, 
“scientific” sense: this “object” is not one which can be clearly apprehended from afar, i.e., from 
an instrumentally disaffected vantage that presupposes the observing subject’s extraneous 
relation to the object under scrutiny.  It is not an object that can be engaged along a flat, two-
dimensional trajectory of reality whereby objects unfold according to a meaningful, horizontal 
procession of causal appearances.  Properly speaking, the object of laughter, like the object of 
tears, cannot assume a determinably objective reality: it fails to satisfy the discursive criteria 
with which we isolate, identify, classify, and deploy the objects of consciousness.  Bataille 
explains, “The object of tears or of laughter – and of other effects such as ecstasy, eroticism or 
poetry – seemed to me to correspond to the very point at which thought vanishes” (AS III 208).  
When Bataille affirms the alterity of the object of laughter as that which effects the raid on “clear 
consciousness” characteristic of the “lived experience” of laughter, the “object” to which he 
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refers can be thought of as an “object” only insofar as it is essentially that which violates the 
possibility of clear and distinct “objects,” viz., a consumption or expenditure.  As such, the 
object of laughter is a quintessentially impossible object, where “impossible,” once more, refers 
specifically to “the loss of self.”  Even the model of shared laughter cannot avail the effort to 
identify a common object of laughter: “In laughter, there is not one object that independently 
determines the same effects in different laughters” (AS III 242).  Though we may assume that we 
laugh in response to the same object or event when we burst into a shared laugh, we can never 
really know that the caustic fuse of “my” laughter and “your” laughter is identical because such 
an object-cause has no demonstrable existence outside of our laughter.  Ultimately, in order to 
behold this object, we must touch it: dissolving ourselves, our isolation—in laughter!   
Thus penetrating, traversing, or transversing the bursting subjects who laugh at it, the 
object of laughter contorts the laughers themselves into a spectacle worthy of arousing the 
subjective experience that shakes them, the spectacle of an impersonal “community” of beings 
engaged in and diffracting a radiant current of lightness “communicated from subject to subject 
through a sensible, emotional contact” (AS III 242, original emphasis).  This notion of the 
traversing effect which the object of laughter puts in play infuses the movement of this object 
with an explicitly queer itinerary.  In short, the object of laughter cruises.  “Cruising,” as Leo 
Bersani sees it, is a form of utopic “sexual sociability” permeating many public, albeit 
subterranean, haunts of homoerotic intimacy (e.g., bathhouses).  Bersani’s use of the term 
“sociability” derives from his interpretation of the sociology of Georg Simmel, where 
“sociability,” in general, refers to “relationality uncontaminated by desire”; therefore, “cruising” 
(qua “sexual sociability”) involves an eroticized relationality “uncontaminated” by the eagerness 
to acquire and possess that overdetermines any enterprise spurred by desire (qua lack) (9).  
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Bersani’s understanding of “cruising” as “sexual sociability” emphasizes encounters with “an 
otherness that cannot be named, defined, known, understood, controlled, or domesticated” 
(Brintnall 70).  Similarly, in Unlimited Intimacy, Tim Dean understands “cruising” as 
comparable to the male homoerotic practice of “barebacking” in that cruising “involves [an] 
intimacy with strangers” which elides  “knowledge or understanding of the other—that is, 
without the subtle violence that usually accompanies epistemological relations” (205).  Rooted in 
“impersonal intimacy,” cruising deconstructs established understandings of intersubjectivity and 
desire.  “Its most significant feature,” as Kent Brintnall explains,  
is its capacity to prevent the self’s acquisitive, appropriative, aggressive relation 
to the world by short-circuiting desire’s longing to understand and possess the 
other.  Cruising—in the ideal form Bersani and Dean endorse—promotes contact 
with the other that impedes the self’s instrumental, purpose-driven, goal-oriented 
relation to the world, contact resulting from happy accidents with unknown 
objects of desire.  (70-1) 
 
No doubt, shared laughter can be pregnant with erotic overtones, a burst flushed with a mutual 
blush, faces suddenly alight with the colored touch of libidinal winks.  But what I am suggesting, 
by way of imagining the object of laughter’s trajectory as one which follows the unmotivated 
itinerary of cruising, is that the object of laughter forges an impersonal space in which an ever-
widening “community” of beings invests in an eroticized relation void of the acquisitive quest to 
possess or comprehend an object that gives desire its structure (qua lack). 
 In a sense, it is precisely such an unmotivated space of shared subjectivity (qua the 
sharing of self-loss) that Bataille seeks to generate with his reader in identifying the movement 
of his thought with laughter.  Bataille’s “impossible thought,” as such, aims to rope the subject of 
thought (viz., the reader) into a mode of thinking that drifts along such impersonal, risky, 
groundless terrain that the thinking subject’s “getting its drift” means surrendering to an opening 
up to a dissolution of isolated subjectivity.  And here, finally, we come upon the consummate 
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paradox emergent in this Bataillean “drift” towards the dislocation of the episteme that sustains 
the self-conscious subject as a subject who knows (itself): namely, this sliding of thought, this 
turning of thought’s very movement onto the death of the thinking subject as we know it, 
circuitously enables the epistemological occasion for a reimagining of the vehicles and vectors of 



















3     THE FESTIVAL OF LAUGHTER AND THOUGHT 
I am a cry of joy! 
     —“Meditations of Method” (1947) 
3.1 The Obscure Intimacy of Consciousness 
In light of all this (laughter), who am I?  What am I?  I am, in short, this (being) 
questioning the nature of (my) being—who am I? what am I?—that is, this “absence of 
agreement with [myself]”: “I am, man is, the interrogation of what is, of being wherever it is; 
limitless interrogation, or the interrogation of being by being itself” (G 85, 79, my emphasis).  
Human, all-too-human is the spirit of revolt: “This existence that I am is a revolt against 
existence and is indefinite desire” (ON 187, original emphasis).  Human “being,” as such, enlists 
“being” in an interminably renewed gesture of insubordination to given conditions, an 
unrelenting assault upon the existential limits of a life bound by finitude: to “be” (human) is to 
“go beyond what [being] is”—a movement raging towards a traversal of finite existence that is 
tantamount to being human (ON 187).  To be human is to be in the storm, striving towards the 
extreme limits of possibility: the human’s is “the lot of a conditioned being who bears within him 
not only the conditions of being, of the particular being he is, but a general aspiration of beings 
to be free of their conditions, to negate them” (AS III 343).  Human beings are, of course, 
organic existences and, therefore, must fulfill biological needs of subsistence.  But the 
fundamental condition of being human is a refusal of the given conditions of nature: “A revolt, a 
refusal of the offered condition, is evinced in man’s attitude at the very beginning” (AS II 77).  I 
am “nature” insofar as I am an organic existence entangled in the seething cesspool of living and 
dying; and yet, at the same time, I am nature contesting nature, “revolting intimately against the 
fact of dying” (AS II 91, original emphasis). 
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Now, the negation of nature, according to Bataille, “has two clearly and distinctly 
opposed aspects: that of horror and repugnance, which implies fever and passion, and that of 
profane life, which assumes the fever has subsided” (AS II 93-4).  From the get-go, human life is 
hailed into the breach, into the disequilibrium of a thrust and counterthrust between “movements 
that destroy one another” (AS III 342).  Bataille ultimately reduces the entire claptrap of human 
history, culture, activity, and interaction to an “impossibility of being human,” to the 
impossibility of schematizing a stable, self-sufficient system of equilibrium and compatibility out 
of the mélange of incompatible impulses—viz., the mutually-intransigent impulses of prohibition 
and transgression—that describes the specifically human world as a constitutively undecided 
crucible of experience: “The human world is finally but a hybrid of transgression and 
prohibition, so that the word human always denotes a system of contradictory impulses” (AS III 
342, original emphases).  In the final analysis, “the human quality” shines wherever it sparks the 
flame of revolt against the given, “whatever this may be, provided it is given” (AS III 343). 
The given, as such, has two distinct “instances” or “stages” in the historical course of 
human experience: “For man, the given was originally what the prohibition refused: the 
animality that no rule limited.  The prohibition itself in turn became the given that man refused” 
(AS III 343).  In the first instance, what is given is the biological condition(s) of animal 
existence, “the model of life without history,” whereby the world is experienced immanently and 
immediately in the ahistorical absence of qualitative limits and difference (AS II 94).  “Profane 
life,” which assumes a differential life in duration and a coherence of things relatively immune to 
the continuity of nature, emerges out of “a deep mistrust of what is accidental, natural, 
perishable” (AS II 91).  But the “profane” labor of denying the human animal’s existential 
dependence on the loathsome bed of its carnal origins is ultimately “fictitious” (AS II 92).  For, 
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in the final instance, how can I deny the undeniable—the fact that I will die and rot away in the 
labyrinthine guts of the nature that I so despise?  The “failure of the [profane] negation of 
nature,” Bataille speculates, “could not fail to appear inevitable from the beginning” (AS II 92).  
In its resistance to “violent and destructive changes” (e.g., revolutionary change), its opposition 
to historical fluctuations that threaten to capsize the reproduction of a familiar and recognizable 
order of things, the prohibition eventually reifies the narrow utilitarian limits of “profane life” as 
given (AS II 94).  A transgression of the conditions introduced by the prohibition thus “becomes 
irreplaceable in human life” (AS III 340). 
The transgressive movement of sacred revolt, violently overflowing the dikes sustaining 
“profane life,” unleashes repressed animal rumblings in a renewed gesture of insubordination to 
the given; however, rather than obliterating the limit established by the prohibition, this 
transgressive burst “consecrates and completes an order of things based on rules” insofar as it 
“goes against them only temporarily” (AS II 90).  In this way, transgression paradoxically obeys 
the limit which it violates, or, rather, its condition of possibility is predicated on embracing a 
refined limit:     
A profound difference results from the fact that the “nature” that is desired after 
being rejected is not desired in submission to the given, as it may have been in the 
first instance, in the fleeting moment of animal excitation: it is nature transfigured 
by the curse, to which the spirit then accedes only through a new movement of 
refusal, of insubordination, of revolt.  (AS II 78, original emphases) 
 
The “sacred,” a term Bataille “reappropriate[s] from the more domesticated modern forms of 
religion” and recasts as a recovery, albeit fleetingly, of “a sense of the primal immanence that 
Hegel had argued was characteristic of pre-cultural experience,” is “precisely what is prohibited” 
from “profane life” (Hayes 230; AS II 92, original emphasis).  Its creeping emergence ignites “a 
privileged moment of communal unity, a moment of the convulsive communication of what is 
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ordinarily stifled” (VE 242).  The return of this accursed remnant of animal disorderliness does 
not, however, simply introduce “the return of man to his vomit” (i.e., to the pure immanence and 
primal avidity of animality) (AS II 92).  Rather, the sacred movement of transgression signals the 
“transfiguration” of “animal form” into something “divine”: “Something unfamiliar and 
disconcerting [comes] into being, something that [is] no longer simply nature, but nature 
transfigured, the sacred” (AS II 92, original emphasis).  “As such, relative to profane life this 
sacred animality has the same meaning that the negation of nature (hence profane life) has 
relative to pure animality” (AS II 92, original emphasis).  Denis Hollier argues that the 
“opposition” between the profane and sacred spheres constitutes “the matrix of Bataille’s 
thought,” and indeed, Bataille affirms, “Simultaneously—or successively—[human life] is made 
up of the profane and the sacred” (DM 65; E 67).  But this “opposition” is not, strictly speaking, 
an opposition: for it is the same movement—the all-too-human movement of revolt—which had 
established the discontinuity of the profane world that ultimately obliterates this discontinuity.  
Whereas profane life emerged out of the utilitarian denial of animality’s “natural” servility to the 
contingencies of nature, the sacred emerges out of a sumptuous denial of profane subjectivity’s 
voluntary submission to the lucidity of discourse.  Whereas the profane produces separation and 
discursive discontinuity, subject and object, the sacred fuses the obverse relations which the 
profane labors to establish.  The movement of negativity that initially introduced the 
establishment of limits now shatters those limits.  
The deadlock arising from the mutual incompliance of the two fundamental stadiums 
(viz., prohibition and transgression) through which unfurls the movement of human life—a 
medley of the possible and the impossible—finds its “limited solution” in what Bataille calls “the 
festival” (TR 53).  Bataille describes the prodigal festival of primitive, “naïve” societies as a 
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communal unleashing of an “internal violence” (i.e., “the moral principle of consumption”) 
which expressed itself in the “unrestrained consumption of [the society’s] products and the 
deliberate violation of the most hallowed laws” (TR 61; AS II 90).  In the darkest, faraway 
reaches of human civilization and consciousness, this conflagration reached its feverish summit 
with the community’s gratuitous sacrifice of its chief, the community rendering itself headless: 
“[The chief’s] immolation – consented to by the people he embodied, if not by him – could have 
given the rising tide of killings the value of an unlimited consumption” (AS I 63).  The chief’s 
annihilation by his own people actualizes a collective automutilation, a self-inflicted schism in 
the integrity of the community reflecting the rift in the undifferentiated tapestry of nature out of 
which all things human come into being.  But eventually, as Christopher Gemerchak explains, 
this practice was condemned, the king being replaced by the “carnival king,” a 
slave temporarily assuming a sovereign status.  And while the sacrifice of the 
slave was an internal violence insofar as the slave could be made to serve the 
community, in effect this substitution, this refusal to gloriously expend their own 
king, to make their community acephalous, was a rejection of internal violence.  
(106, original emphasis) 
 
This substitution corresponded to a progressive exporting of the community’s violent energies, 
directing these energies outward towards other communities through the “external violence” of 
warfare, which is so often mobilized with the aims of acquiring territory and accumulating 
resources (TR 57).  The festival, in turn, would become increasingly “confined to the limits of a 
reality of which it was the negation” (TR 54).   
 But this intrusion of profane limits into the limitless sphere of consumption introduces a 
pivotal effect that will lead Bataille to posit the festival as “the culmination of a movement 
toward autonomy, which is, forevermore, the same thing as man himself” (AS II 91).  Namely, 
the festival becomes a space of experience both “measureless and measured at the same time” 
(AS II 108-9).  Rather than a return to “true immanence,” the festival seeks “an amicable 
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reconciliation, full anguish, between the incompatible necessities” of self-preservation and 
consumption, prohibition and transgression (TR 55).  In order for humanity to truly experience 
autonomy over the organic existence to which it is bound (by its very “being”), it would have to 
somehow synthesize the limits that define it—that affirm its asymmetry apropos of animality—
with the limitless violence of expenditure.  Expenditure, as we have seen, is fundamentally 
incompatible with thought insofar as thought constitutes an exercise bent on the acquisition of 
knowledge and/or power.  The festival takes shape through an all-too-human effort to introduce 
the value of the limit—out which thought comes to light—to the boundless play of energy.  It is 
the movement whereby the human subject struggles to “grasp what eludes him” (AS I 70).  The 
festival thus involves a subject overcome by the infinite movement of an ungraspable giving 
away (i.e., a movement of loss and destruction) while, at the same time, engaging the subject in a 
languishing attempt to grasp the ungraspable, “to somehow bring our going-beyond back within 
our limits” (AS I 69).  On the one hand, the festival permits, in some cases even requires, its 
subject to let loose the contents of a bottomless reservoir of loss he knew not that he had, 
surpassing the limits of isolation and profane necessity in the unbinding of this intimate, solar 
drift towards unrestrained loss.  And yet, at the same time, the subject is spurred towards the 
possibility of appropriating the very movement of this surpassing so as “to combine the limitless 
movements of the universe with the limit that belongs to him” (AS I 70). 
 Difficulties arise from the fact that the ungraspable resides not simply “outside” the life 
of the human mind; it is not simply an ecological reality that can be observed “out there” in the 
universe and, thereby, assimilated into a meaningful economy of events.  It is rather “the obscure 
intimacy of consciousness itself,” that which consciousness had to cast aside or excrete (the 
opposite of assimilation) in order to become clear and which, therefore, induces the loss of 
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“clear consciousness” as the latter draws near its consumptive flame (TR 57).  As Hollier rightly 
observes, the Bataillean festival, thereby, differs crucially from the Bakhtinian carnival in which 
participants undergo an experience of liberating profundity and abundance in the vanishing of 
the “I” that carnival supposes.  The Bataillean festival is not a scene of enjoyment delivered via 
some temporary reprieve from the pang of discontinuity.  It takes place in the beclouded hour in 
which “the I lives its loss, lives itself as loss” (AA xxiii).  “This is not a time of plenitude,” 
explains Hollier, “it is, on the contrary, the time when time’s emptiness is experienced” (AA 
xxiii).  It evokes not the primordial innocence of the brute but the “bottomless guilt” of this 
figure at odds with itself that, therefore, I am (guilty!) (AA xxiii).  The festival is, finally, a 
celebration of loss in which the subject struggles to acquire loss, to make loss her power. 
And is this not the very field of Bataille’s “impossible thought”?  That is, in the final 
analysis, inasmuch as “the festival” which Bataille explores refers to an actual anthropological 
practice, historical experience, or cultural event, does it not also describe the very “matrix” of 
that composite and contradictory movement of thought whereby one retreats from nothing yet 
somehow manages to escape an outright absence of limits that would escort one into an 
undifferentiated realm of unintelligible nonsense?  Hence Bataille’s identification of his thought 
with laughter: according to Bataille, it is “the marriage of power and loss” which a burst of 
laughter consummates (G 93).  That is, if Bataille’s “philosophy of laughter” evokes an effort to 
overcome the incongruity of epistemology and expenditure (if only for a “sovereign moment”), it 
is because such a moment of surmounting this impasse is already internal to bursts of laughter.  
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3.2 Laughter’s Leap 
Of course, laughter is not in itself synonymous with the festival: “[Y]et in its own way it 
indicates the festival’s meaning – indeed, laughter is always the whole movement of the festival 
in a nutshell” (AS II 90, my emphasis).  Although Bataille never crystallizes his meditations on 
laughter as such, I submit that we might extrapolate from this comparison with the festival the 
notion that, in the repetition of bursts, laughter suspends the spatial-temporal difference that 
conventionally separates the impulses of prohibition and transgression.12  In the evental instant of 
its kairotic burst—more specifically, its repetition—laughter sonorously hybridizes these 
“contradictory impulses,” such that, in the immanent repetition of animated peals of human joy, 
the mutually-destructive movements of prohibition and transgression dynamize each other. 
                                                 
12 Even though both prohibition and transgression bear in their movements the trace of the other’s possibility, they 
generally do not penetrate each other directly.  Each movement is quarantined from the other by a system of spatial-
temporal difference: the dialectic interaction of prohibition and transgression receives its organizational 
instrumentation in the partitioning of these “movements that destroy one another” into mutually-exclusive hours 
reserved respectively for the profane activities of hard labor and science and for the sacred madness of violence and 
play.  Indeed, “sacred communication,” for example that experienced in the “elementary forms” of sacrifice and 
eroticism, requires not only an initiating realization or performative articulation of difference in order that this 
difference may be disarticulated, but it also necessitates a particular spatial and temporal milieu which is 
demonstrably “removed” from the prosaic world of labor and discourse.  This designated milieu is, indeed, 
indispensable, for obviously neither acts of ritual murder nor those of erotic effusion can be practiced “out in the 
open,” or at least not amidst the routinized machinations and productive activities of everyday life.  Not only would 
an unrestricted admission of such practices threaten society’s sustained existence with the epidemic levels of 
violence and hygienic hazards such an unlimited fever of lawlessness would surely unleash, but should these events 
that facilitate the movement of “sacred communication” lose their designated milieu “outside” the everyday, then 
such events would lose their lavishness and transgressive intensity.  It is, indeed, the very fact that such acts are 
prohibited from the everyday spheres of consciousness and experience that lends them the wicked glow of 
“communication,” and their degree of seductive vigor grows in proportion to the gravity of the prohibition.  
Consequently, the sacred play of “communication” experienced in these “elementary forms” always necessarily 
obeys a system of spatial and temporal difference separating the sacred twilight of carnival madness from the 
scheduled hours of the workday hump.  The society of labor simply cannot function, thrive, nor survive if such 
forcefully “nonproductive” movements are not exiled from the time and place of the consciousness and experience 
of the human subject hard at work—a lonesome schmuck enclosed in a cubicle and possessed by erotic daydreams is 
but an idle set of hands, indeed.  Hence, the inversion of profane, utilitarian values evinced in the play of 
“communication” is only ever a temporary affair, no matter the particular inversion’s transgressive enormity or 
ferocity.  All such vehicles of “communication” must abide by a statute of limitations, and this temporal modicum of 
control ensures not only that such sacred events stay sacred, but also that they may be effectively monitored and 
moderated, contained by the law and consigned to secrecy, truncated to a certain admissible period of time, confined 
to certain designated venues, limited to holidays and anniversaries, and, if need be, outlawed altogether.    
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 For one, in contrast to sacrifice and eroticism, and notwithstanding all its “sovereign” 
incandescence as a form of “communication,” laughter is an utterly quotidian experience, an 
aspect of routine reality: “Now, of all sorts of intense communication, none is more common 
than the laughter which stirs us in (each other’s) company” (S 68).  But let us not let the 
ordinariness of laughter fool us: its prevalence amidst the unremarkable realities of “profane life” 
does not indicate the impoverishment of its transgressive violence and play.  Rather, I submit 
that its regularity amongst the more mundane comings and goings of human activity affirms our 
inability to satisfactorily control and regulate it and the consumptive play it discharges.  Though 
we may at times succeed in silencing its convulsive clamor, this “lived experience” cannot be 
sufficiently enclosed by the prohibition nor by a sanctioned interplay of prohibition and 
transgression whereby the latter is constitutively “removed” from the practice of everyday life.  
Though we may try to “civilize” laughter, eschewing the impropriety of excessive, extravagant, 
vulgar laughs and shunning laughter amid occasions whose solemnity or seriousness deem 
laughter unseemly, the limits of moderation and the forums of propriety that we prescribe to 
laughter can never contain this disruptive experience entirely.  Laughter could never suffer the 
fate that sacrifice has in the modern world, for prohibitions against laughter—for example, when 
nineteenth century physiognomist George Vasey offered his vision of utopia as a world without 
laughter13—so frequently and so unwittingly render themselves vulnerable to the consumptive 
burst they seek to deny.  Thus, we can never fully insulate the civilized, ordered domain of 
“profane life” from the disrepute of laughter.  For laughter is intimately bound to our 
“pathological psychology” (VE 67).  It is a definitive feature of humanity, and yet, it is a feature 
                                                 
13 See George Vasey, The Philosophy of Laughter and Smiling. London: J. Burns, 1877. 
53 
of the “lived experience” of humans that is—to humans and to humanity—compulsively 
unknown, even unknowable.   
 In his essay “An Extravagance of Laughter” (1985), Ralph Ellison reproduces a 
vernacular joke, known as the “laughing barrel” joke, that elucidates the contagion of laughter as 
mobilizing “the most vicious of vicious circles” in the context of racial inequality in America 
(192).  The joke interrogates the dangers of African American laughter presupposed by the 
paranoia and prejudice of the dominant white class.  It introduces us to a small town in the 
American South in which the rights of African Americans are so suppressed that their right to 
laugh in public places has been expressly forbidden, the dominant whites fearing the potentially 
threatening contagion of black laughter, alleging that blacks lack the fortitude to master their 
emotions.  On the one hand, this widespread prejudice, espousing the notion that blacks cannot 
control their baser impulses, underscores an imperative of racist white society to prohibit black 
laughter; however, such a prohibition, apropos of the very content that emerges from the racist 
logic of the town’s whites (viz., that blacks cannot control themselves), necessarily destines itself 
to failure.  In an effort to circumvent this impasse, the town devises the ludicrous idea of placing 
large wooden barrels bearing the label “For Colored” on street corners and at all the major 
thoroughfares.  Should a black person fall into convulsions of laughter, he or she is to place his 
or her head inside one of these designated barrels.  Here the peculiar coincidence of prohibition 
and transgression comes alive: when, for example, a laughing black man places his head upside-
down in the barrel, his laughter may intensify, propagate, and redouble as he perceives the 
ridiculousness of his own image, inverted in a barrel on the street, his feet dancing about where 
his head should be.  The laughter reverberating from the barrel may also catch passing whites in 
the contagion of its convulsion, such that figures of authority, such as politicians and priests, 
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along with blue collar members of the white working class, such farmhands, and even 
bootleggers and criminals may all fall into a kind of volatile “community” with the laughing 
black man.  The hierarchic class gradations internal to white society as well as those marking 
racial boundaries become suspended.  And yet, notwithstanding this relaxation of established 
social boundaries, the whites shaken in the hilarity echoing from the barrel occupied by the black 
man’s laughing head may come to realize or suspect, amidst peals of laughter, that the black man 
in the barrel laughs not solely at himself, but also at them and at their laughter.  White paranoia 
about the alleged unruliness of African American behavior and psychology is relaxed or 
suspended in a cross-cultural convulsion yet simultaneously concentrated, reinforced, magnified.  
White anxiety about black laughter and the threat it poses to the racially-stratified order of things 
seems to quicken and intensify: whites’ attitudes towards blacks becomes even more obstinate 
and petulant even as this quickening of splenetic, racist angst emerges out of a experiential 
moment in which the established limits that subordinate African American life (and laughter) to 
the moral proprieties of whites bursts, a moment in which racial and class-oriented societal limits 
fall away in the opening of a reverberating space inhabited by a syncopated community of 
laughers.  Not only do the measures taken to ensure that the laughter of the town’s black 
denizens does not disrupt the comings and goings of town-life fail to prevent such a disruption, 
but the prohibition against blacks’ laughter is precisely what leads to this disruption and to its 
intensification.  The prohibition itself sets the stage for laughter to ensnare both blacks and 
whites of all classes in a convulsive communal unity in which the racial paranoia underpinning 
the prohibition both unhinges and (re)asserts itself, abolishing and renewing itself—almost (if 
not) simultaneously—amid the repetition of laughter’s bursts.  The prohibition’s intensified 
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(re)affirmation and renewal effectively coincides with the repetition of a compulsive 
transgression of the ordered, racial boundary it outlines. 
Bataille intimates a comparable coincidence of the laying down and lifting of the limit 
when he writes, “Laughter is an eviction of moral servitude.  It implicates these limits at the 
same time” (G 237).  Moreover, in the section of Guilty entitled “The Divinity of Laughter,” 
Bataille aphoristically captures—or, rather, exacerbates—the coincidence of laughter’s 
“suspension” by thematizing laughter as a “leap”: 
Laughter is a leap from the possible to the impossible—and from the impossible 
to the possible.  But it is only a leap: maintaining it would reduce the impossible 
to the possible—or the inverse.  (G 90, original emphasis) 
 
The feature of laughter that entails a slippage from “the possible to the impossible,” a movement 
of “backwardation” from the known back into the unknown that describes the movement of 
“sacred communication,” has not gone unrecognized by critics invested in Bataille’s work.  
Gerhard Poppenberg, for example, puts this aspect of the “leap” into most exact terms: “Laughter 
is the experience of the loss of the self” (n.p.).  Indeed, the affinity laughter shares with an 
eruption of the imagined self-sufficiency of the subject and with a neutralization of the moral 
scruples that accompany the subject’s isolation and “clear consciousness” is what’s most 
understandable about Bataillean laughter.  That laughter disrupts understanding suits our 
understanding most.  But what of the leap’s curious, ostensibly coincident doubling back “into 
the possible”? 
 Perhaps, simply by asking this question, I am guilty of attempting to “maintain” the 
“leap,” risking the reduction of either the impossible to the possible or the possible to the 
impossible.  But this is a risk that I am willing to take.  For only in asking this question can we 
approximate what Bataille means when he writes, “In laughter, the limits are overcome in a 
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single point.  But the condition of laughter is that their networks remain” (G 237).  Despite 
laughter’s ostensible explosion of the limits that define “the possible” and that make possible 
“the exercise of thought,” Bataille’s insistence on laughter’s concurrent “leap” “from the 
impossible into the possible” suggests that consciousness might come into being the moment of 
its collapse into “unknowing,” though the latter, strictly speaking, cannot be “known,” for the 
appropriation of this flash of consciousness into the developmental kingdom of knowledge 
would betray the prestige of this experience as unknowing.  Bataille returns to similar territory in 
“Nonknowledge, Laughter and Tears”:  
 In fact, someone who laughs, in principle, does not abandon his science, 
but he refuses to accept it for a while, a limited time, he lets himself pass beyond 
it through the movement of laughter, so that what he knows is destroyed, but in 
his depths he preserves the conviction that, just the same, it isn’t destroyed.  
Someone who laughs preserves, deep within in him, what laughter suppresses, but 
that it only suppressed artificially if you will; likewise, laughter has the ability to 
suspend a closed logic.  In fact, when we are in this domain, we are just as able to 
preserve our beliefs without believing in them, and reciprocally we can know that 
which we simultaneously destroy as known.  (NLT 144) 
 
It is as though, amidst peals of laughter, one were to abruptly espy one’s own fall into the night 
of “unknowing.”  If upon awakening to the experience of unknowing one attempts to assimilate 
it, one loses one’s intimate access to this “lived experience,” forfeiting one’s awakening in the 
cessation of laughter which the active drive towards the acquisition of knowledge demands: “The 
laughter is suspended; it leaves the one who laughs in suspense.  No one can sustain it; 
maintaining laughter is ponderous.  Laughter is suspended, affirms nothing, appeases nothing” 
(G 90, my emphasis).  One cannot bring anything back from the obscure realm of unknowing 
into which laughter delivers us; there are no blessings nor benefits, no souvenirs nor 
memorabilia, nothing to be salvaged nor “saved” from this amorphous night trembling out 
beyond the diurnal horizon that yields to the phenomenologist’s discerning gaze: “Short of dying 
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of [laughter], one leaves [it] like a thief (or as one leaves a girl after love), dazed, thrown back 
stupidly into the absence of death: into distinct consciousness, activity, and work” (IE 111).  
Laughter simply illuminates for an instant this “riant spaciousness” (to borrow from Kristeva) 
suffused entirely by the vacuum of consciousness into which all consciousness finally devolves 
(in death), a sudden, unanticipated irradiation of consciousness amidst the formless space of an 
excess of consciousness (DL 283). 
 Insofar as its repetitive burst displaces the “closed logic” of prohibition and transgression, 
laughter bears witness to the notion that the speculative coherence of the discursive subject 
always already transgresses the limit of its differential identity, that the transgression of the limit 
of individuation instantiated by the prohibition inheres in the articulation of the limit.  The 
“birth” of the subject of Bataillean consciousness, as such, emerges in simultaneity with an 
originary “death” of consciousness.  The Bataillean subject, in one sense, would thereby appear 
radically opposed to the more established Lacanian subject whose primordial matrix arrives 
through an imaginary méconnaissance (misrecognition) of itself in the physically coordinated 
and psychically unified mirage of its mirror image, which the fragmented and uncoordinated 
human infant uses as a developmental “prosthesis” (Fink 71).  Human subjectivity à la Bataille, 
on the other hand, originates in a contagious moment of disequilibrium “communicated” to the 
child via a moment of shared laughter with the mother: “Laughter is reducible—in general—to 
the laughter of recognition in a child—that evokes Virgil’s verse: incipe, parve puer, risu 
cognoscere matrem” (G 128, original emphasis).14  “For Bataille, then,” as Nidesh Latwoo 
explains, “in the beginning was laughter” (80).  The Bataillean subject comes into being in a 
moment of heterogeneous identification with the (m)other, paradoxically recognizing the limits 
                                                 
14 The translation of this verse that Bataille provides is as follows: “‘Begin, young child, to recognize your mother 
by your laughter’ but also ‘by her laughter’” (G 128).  
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of individuation in a moment of affective permeability or fusion.15  Rather than “assuming” the 
imaginary ideal-ego reflected in the mirror, the Bataillean subject originally emerges in a 
contagion which defaces the stable, coherent mien of this ideal, in a joyous compulsion which 
rails against the libidinal impulse to equate oneself with the uniform, masterful other.  The stage 
of the subject’s eventual achievement of a discrete, differential identity in discursive, dialectical 
relation to the other is thus, according to Bataille’ understanding, prepared by a moment of 
originary “openness” to the heterogeneity of “communication,” or, as Latwoo describes, the 
Bataillean subject “is ‘always already’ open to the experience of transgression, insofar as it is 
precisely through such an originary transgression of limits that the communicative subject – 
ticklish as it is – emerges into being” (80). 
3.3 Bataille’s Summit 
The ultimate paradox of Bataille’s “philosophy of laughter” is that Bataille posits 
laughter at both “ends” of “the human pyramid,” inscribing the “lived experience” of laughter in 
the beginning and in the summit of human experience: “[A] burst of laughter is the only 
imaginable and definitively terminal result—and not the means—of philosophical speculation” 
(VE 177, 99).  Indeed, in his return to the Bergson encounter in Inner Experience, Bataille 
confesses to having imagined, from the very inception of his obsessive interrogation of “the 
puzzle of laughter,” that a resolution to the eternal mysteries of this curious, ostensibly 
innocuous burst “would of itself solve everything” (IE 66, original emphasis).  Bataille will even 
go so far as to claim—quite laughably yet not without an awareness of his claim’s risibility—a 
synonymy between bursts of laughter and the heights of human ontology itself: “What happens 
                                                 
15 We might do well here to recall Bataille’s rather astonishing depiction of fusion in Guilty: “Fusion introduces 
another existence in me (it introduces this other in me as mine, and at the same time as other)” (G 129, original 
emphases).  The child’s originary recognition of itself would thus correspond to a recognition of its own 
heterogeneity apropos of its contradictory recognition of the other as simultaneously “me” and “other.”      
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in laughter is precisely the existence of man, it is the essence of man, that in man which escapes 
nature and challenges it” (G 238).  This seemingly ludicrous claim crops up again and again in 
Bataille’s theoretical writing (though especially in his earlier works): “I’ve always recoiled 
before expiration: I’ve always been afraid of what I was: LAUGHTER ITSELF!” (G 80, original 
emphasis).  Or, as Bataille writes in “The Labyrinth” (1936), “Laughter is . . . assumed by the 
totality of being” (VE 177).  Mind you, in the latter instance, Bataille is not speaking simply of 
individual “beings,” neither “his” being, “my” being, nor “yours,” but “being itself, to the extent 
that it is the sum of existences at the limits of the night, [being] spasmodically shaken by the idea 
of the ground giving way beneath its feet” (VE 177).  Such extravagances of thought appear to 
be but mad intoxications with the experience of laughter—which they are!—and yet, they also 
touch upon, as does the mad intoxication which is the “lived experience” of laughter itself, the 
very substance of Bataille’s ontology, laughable though it is. 
Indeed, according to Bataille, laughter is what is “most human” about our experience: 
“Roughly, even, “nothing is less natural than laughter.” (G 237, original emphasis).  The 
paradox of this formulation of human ontology lies in the fact that, as a cachinnating contestation 
of transcendence (“To destroy transcendence there has to be laughter”), laughter may appear to 
be a “natural fact” (ON 55; G 237, original emphasis).  “[I]n appearance,” writes Bataille, 
“[laughter] returns man to nature and deprives him of his autonomy—normally assimilated into 
the exercise of reason” (G 237).  In particular, immoderate, uncontrollable laughter, exalting 
feral cries rather than meaningful articulations, may seem especially bestial in the lack of rational 
composure and control over repressed, disorderly stirrings it implies.  Excessive laughter’s 
enmity with the operations of reason and productive labor would, thereby, seem to suggest that 
this experience delivers the subject caught in its convulsive grasp back into the serpentine night 
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of animality.  As Denis Hollier affirms, “What it utters is not a phenomenon of reason but a 
material emission charged with the heterogeneous insubordination of base matter” (AA 81).  
Laughter must, therefore, be thought of in a long series of excretions, including vomit, drool, 
afterbirth, sperm, spit, piss, shit, etc. (AA 81).  And, indeed, Bataille draws an explicit 
connection between bursts of laughter and baser bodily functions:  
Laughter as a spasmodic process of the oral orifice’s sphincter muscles, analogous 
to that of the sphincter muscles of the anal orifices during defecation, is probably 
the only satisfying interpretation—in both cases taking account of the primary 
role in human existence of such spasmodic processes with excretory function.  
When it comes to outbursts of laughter, we must thus admit that the nervous 
discharge that could have been normally released by the anus (or by the adjacent 
sexual organs) is being released by the oral orifice.  (qt. in Menninghaus 355) 
 
Like the excremental fluids of abjection, laughter, without question, menaces “the world that 
creates and preserves”: its burst seizes upon its subject(s) like an overwhelming urge, 
abandoning them to the unleashing of a storm of wild roars which threaten the antiseptic world 
of acquisition and duration, giving free play to unproductive drives constitutively refused by 
workday regulations (TR 49).  But notwithstanding laughter’s manifest affinity with the fluids of 
abjection and thus with the excremental emblems of animality, Bataille assures us that “there is 
nothing more contrary to animality than laughter” (AS II 90). 
 We can approximate Bataille’s meaning here if we return to the issue of human 
verticality, that “decisive reversal of animal existence” which is so instrumental to the 
development of a recognizably human world (VE 89).  This alienation of the bestial fury of 
animal being, an alienation which undergirds the entire historical development of a “spiritual” 
modality of being, is, according to Bataille, reducible to an “inversion of the anal orifice” (VE 
89).  The origin of our “spiritual” capacities lies in a radical metamorphosis of the hominid 
hindquarters: the hideously expressive rear-ends of our simian ancestors becomes secreted away 
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deep within the flesh as we raised ourselves from all fours.  In this suppression of “the decorative 
riches of the excremental extremity of apes,” we gave up sniffing each other’s nether regions and 
repressed our aggressive drives and baser bodily functions (VE 89).  As Freud conjectured in 
Civilization and Its Discontents, this “organic repression” of the baser functions of physiology 
introduced distance between such functions and the more dignified functions of epistemology 
through the concurrent elevation of ocular perception to the point of primacy given unto smell 
amongst most mammalian species.  But Bataille is not willing to let go of the obscene, delirious 
forces discharged from the ape’s anal protuberance.  Rather, he speculates that the “obscure vital 
thrusts” blossoming from the ape’s ass “were suddenly thrown back in the direction of the face,” 
which had acquired something of the ape’s excretory efflorescence and expressivity in “the 
strange faculty of sobbing and bursting into laughter” VE (89).  Thus, laughter testifies to the 
endurance of repressed animal energies, while, nevertheless, remaining indissociable from the 
all-too-human achievement of verticality.  The whiff of anality unleashed in laughter’s burst(s), 
thereby, speaks to the human subject’s incapacity to roundly authenticate a “utilitarian 
justification for his actions” (VE 117, original emphasis). 
 The trace of animal excess that lingers in our laughter ultimately testifies to Bataille’s 
supposition that laughter entails the dynamic power to identify with what it denies.  If laughter is 
a sonorous laceration of natural existence, its association with the nonproductive drives of an 
alienated animality attests to a disorienting accordance with what laughter lacerates: “To relate to 
what one denies is precisely laughter, it is dislocation, dissolution” (G 232).  Or, rather, 
“Relating what I am to what I deny, I can only laugh, break myself apart, dissolve myself” (G 
103, my emphasis).  If “what I am” is a questioning of what I am and “what I deny” in so 
questioning is the given condition of my “natural” existence, then laughter—in relating the 
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questioning of my own nature that I am to the very “nature” called into question by my 
“being”—would seem to enlist nature in the questioning of nature.  In bursts of laughter, nature 
interrogates itself: “I don’t know what it is that is gaping and mortally wounded in in laughter; 
the violent suspension that nature does to itself” (G 92).  Laughter is the intimate echo of nature 
contesting nature.  What we hear in the reverberating “presence” of laughter’s peals is nature’s 
self-questioning, nature’s calling-into-question nature’s continuity and, as such, nature’s self-
rending laceration of nature: “Nature opposes nature through me.  I only question nature on the 
condition of being nature” (G 93, original emphasis).  Such an intimate contestation of nature is 
something that profane consciousness cannot avow, for such an unchecked, compulsive pursuit 
of autonomy requires a contestation of nature that does not presuppose the exemption of the 
isolated subject from the interrogation.  Thus the “inextricable nature” of laughter cannot be 
dissociated from the involuntarity from which its burst(s) necessarily issues: the intimate 
contestation of nature must be commensurate with a contestation of one’s own being (G 130).  It 
materializes only via a gesture whose consumptive fury insists upon itself with the intensity of 
such immediacy that the possibility of self-consciously presuming enduring distinctions between 
the subject and object (of contestation) is vehemently disavowed: “If I want to contest nature, I 
must lose myself in it, not isolate myself in my function (like a ‘service’ or a tool)” (G 93).  
Laughter is the intimate sound of this loss, this losing-oneself in the entropic viscera of nature 
that is, paradoxically, commensurate with a human triumph over nature: “Nature vanquished, the 
man that dominates it has the power to relate to that which he dominates: he has the power to 
laugh” (G 103).  When we burst into peals of laughter, we become nothing but this bursting 
sound of nature denaturalizing itself.  It is thus only insofar as I am reduced to nothing (but this 
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meaningless, reverberating sound) that the “being” formerly known as “I” experiences—for an 
inappropriable moment—the autonomy that I am. 
 And so Bataille raises laughter to the summit of human thought and experience.  In 
laughter, however, the conquering of the summit becomes indistinguishable from falling: far 
from a final state of absolute quiescence achieved via the resolution of difference between the 
subject and its object, the experience at the summit entails a blaring osmosis of obverse 
determinations.  The distinction between ascension and decline fuses, whereby, “demand[ing] 
heterogeneity,” each movement is introduced into the other with which it identifies at the same 
time as the other remains irreducibly other.  Laughing, we “suddenly [arrive] at a harrowing fall 
into heaven” (qt. in AA 133).  Indeed, a whole science of sequenced, objective realities and 
reliable, discursive oppositions—life vs. death, high vs. low, up vs. down, self vs. other, subject 
vs. object, depth vs. surface, pain vs. pleasure, assimilation vs. excretion, and, finally, arche vs. 
telos—sinks.  If, as Lucio Angelo Privitello contends, “[a]nimality and laughter make up the 
poles of self-consciousness that do not steal away at the limits when faced with the restoration of 
intimacy,” and if animality describes a world of being in which each being is “in the world like 
water in water,” then the summit of human “being” (qua bursts of laughter) is a world of being 
in which beings suddenly sink, like sugar in water.  What Privitello misses, however, is that this 
sinking at the summit of Bataillean “being” is also inscribed in the origins of this “being” as its 
sinking into being.  Such is the laughing, laughable ontology that shrieks, “I am a cry of joy!”, 
derived from the “impossibility” and excess of a “festival” of thought that claims to do nothing 





 A child stands beside his grieving mother above the sepulchered earth, spellbound by the 
putrid remnant of his father lying supine in a grave before his feet as larva writhe about the 
body’s insides and the maggot’s insatiable kiss licks seething life from the entropic excess 
slipping away from the rank brow of the vanishing face (of the human order).  Surrendering to 
the overwhelming contagion of an asphyxiating horror, the child laughs: 
Laugh  and     laugh 
at           the        sun 
at         the              nettles 
at           the             stones 
at the ducks 
 
at            the       rain 
at   the   pee-pee  of  the  pope 
at             mummy 
at a coffin full of shit  
    (qt. in Land xvi) 
 
As Nick Land observes, this puerile laughter, whose excess and reverberation constitute the 
motivating energy and dramatic kernel of Bataille’s poem “Rire,” draws out an explicit 
association between bursts of laughter and the experience and psychology of mourning (xvi).  
Such an idiosyncratic convergence of conventionally disparate, emotive experiences might 
receive a helpful dose of clarification through reference to the paradigmatic characterization of 
mourning that Freud delivered in “Mourning and Melancholia” by contrasting it with 
melancholia.  Mourning, according to Freud, is an emotive state of psychic deprivation resulting 
from the loss of a specific object of emotional and/or libidinal investment, such as a loved one.  
The work of mourning functions as a normalizing psychic process whereby the subject 
incrementally develops the ability to confront and eventually accept the reality of loss by virtue 
of the ego’s libidinal reinvestment in the world of external objects.  The point of Freud’s 
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relevance to Bataille’s “Rire,” however, is the point at which the mourner passes from a state of 
psychic deadlock into a “mania” whereby the “total amount of counter-investment” resultant 
from the suffering of loss “become[s] available” (321).  Freud writes, “The manic person also 
unmistakably demonstrates his liberation from the object from which he had been suffering by 
pouncing on his new object-investments like a ravenous man” (321).  It is through the movement 
of such a profuse voiding of affective energy that the ego must conquer the emotional 
impoverishment left behind by the loss of the object.  
 Bataille’s “Rire” suggests a comparable trajectory “from inhibition to mania” (Brennan 
53).  But whereas Freud’s manic mourner voraciously invests her libidinal energies in a new 
object, Bataille’s poem represents mourning as a “lived experience” of “ecstatic self-loss” 
unfettered from all psychic investment in discrete objects whatsoever: the child’s laughter glides 
over the surface of an ostensibly arbitrary series of disparate objects—many of which, being 
inanimate, lack entirely in any kind of potentiating comic value—whose interrelation emerges 
only as a consequence of the laughter which traverses them (Brennan 53).  Doubtless, however, 
the principle “object” of interest in the poem is the one represented by the concluding image, 
which comically renders the synonymy of corpses and turds that perennially (re)appears in 
Bataille’s writing: “It is clear . . . that the nature of excrement is analogous to that of corpses” 
(AS II 79).  After all, the occasion of the poem is the coincidence of the funerary and risible 
occasions.   
 Like the fluids of abjection, the corpse, heaving with virulent colonies of grubs and eggs, 
confronts us with “the luxurious truth of death”: namely, that death is “the youth of life,” the 
latter being made possible only insofar as the graveyard swells, only insofar as “the spent 
organisms give way to new ones which enter the dance with new forces” (AS II 79-85).  The 
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corpse exposes “the repulsive condition of life,” whereby life corresponds to an interminable 
movement of upheaval indistinguishable from the movement of death that annihilates it: “[L]ife 
is a product of putrefaction, and it depends on both death and the dungheap” (AS II 80).  A 
“perpetual explosion” or constant passage (“the opposite of a state”), “life is effusion; it is 
contrary to equilibrium, to stability” (AS II 84-5; G 129).  Life is disequilibrium—a continuous 
movement of alterity and flux, an infinitely open gap alive with immutable mutability, a “luxury 
of which death is the highest degree” (TR 47). 
 Confronted with the horrifying continuity of life and death, the child of “Rire” laughs: “It 
is because life is pure surplus that the child of ‘Rire’ . . . is gripped with convulsions of horror 
that explode into peals of mirth, as uncompromising as an orgasm” (Land xvi).  But the revolting 
“truth” of life is not simply the object of the child’s laughter, for just as the child’s uninhibited 
encounter with this “truth” incites the child’s bursting (into laughter), this bursting is itself an 
expressive exudation of “pure surplus.”  Thus, as Land observes, the child does not laugh at 
death (i.e., his laughter does not take death itself as its object), but rather “[l]aughter is 
communion with the dead, since death is not the object of laughter: it is death that finds voice 
when we laugh” (xvi).  Peals of laughter burst forth an evental instant reminiscent of a last gasp 
before the void, where life greets the imperceptible imminence of its exhaustion and death 
speaks through the mouth of the living.  Meanwhile, the human body, its stable figure set ablaze 
in a rictus verging on paralysis, becomes marked by the convulsive insignia of a life-in-excess 
whose undying inscription is worn paradigmatically by cadavers.  In laughter as in death, the 
body embodies the living stain of a “pure surplus” to which all life is always already, always and 
forever fated. 
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 Bataillean laughter laughs at this stained fate.  In “Hegel, Death and Sacrifice,” Bataille 
elucidates this profoundly tragic dimension of laughter: 
It is a question of the death of an other, but in such cases, the death of the other is 
always the image of one’s own death.  One can take delight in this only on one 
condition: the dead man, who is another, supposedly agreeing, the dead who the 
laughing drinker will one day be in his turn, will have no other meaning than did 
the first one.  (HDS 291) 
 
Bataillean “delight,” in the final instance, arrives through an unreserved confrontation with one’s 
own inescapable fate.  It is, indeed, at the profoundly tragic condition of his own human finitude 
that Bataille laughs.  In an illustrative analysis of the passage quoted above, Mikkel Borch-
Jacobsen delivers a stunning articulation of the tragic, existential ramifications of Bataillean 
laughter that rivals Land’s stylized representation of the laughter of “Rire” as a “communion 
with the dead”: “We do not laugh . . . because we are not dead.  We laugh, very much to the 
contrary, because we are dead, because we are, laughing, ourselves the dead man – namely, no 
one who constitutes an ipse, a ‘oneself’” (164, original emphasis).  Nancy offers a comparable 
idea in describing the head through which laughter laughs as a laughing skull: “[T]he laughing 
head could be a skull’s, and it must be . . . . The skull is not laughing at anything . . . ; rather it 
should be stated in the transitive mode: the skull laughs immortality, it confers upon immortality 
the burst of a presence that slips away from it” (“Laughter, Presence” 377).  A burst of laughter 
is itself nothing if not the unforeseen presentation of a slipping away (of presence), a sudden 
becoming-present of a de-presentation of presence, like the incarnation of a “nocturnal flame,” 
where shadow and flame are one (“Laughter, Presence” 379).  The “lived experience” of this 
sudden bursting, thereby, forecloses our capacity to assign (it) absolute value, whether positive 
or negative: “Laughter is neither presence nor absence,” explains Nancy.  “It is the offering of a 
presence in its own disappearance.  It is not given but offered: suspended on the limit of its own 
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presentation” (“Laughter, Presence” 383).  Laughter is an irruptive “presentation” of loss—of 
control and stability, of futurity and duration, of gravity and ground: its very event, its bursting, 
loses itself in its coming, the event of (in)coming loss, “the coming preceding all presence, 
beyond all presence” (“Laughter, Presence” 384, original emphasis).  Like the silence of being 
struck dumb with awe, laughter presents the unpresentable, manifesting what language is 
powerless to identify, offering its burst qua the unrepresentable withdrawal of presence that is 
either too little or too much to be harnessed by the ostensibly illimitable sweep of the signifier. 
 Can we even say with assurance that laughter (positively) exists?  Nothing is less certain.  
Just as the claim “silence exists” denies the substance of what it claims, the claim “laughter 
exists” requires that one not laugh, that one not be laughing, that laughter be in absentia.  
Laughter’s burst is the oblivion of the discursive apparatus that enfranchises the possibility of 
existential valuation—the oblivion which every meaningful, productive human gesture, which 
the entire economic exercise of human posturing—the economy of language, labor, and 
thought—struggles to suppress or, at the very least, sublimate into an operative grid or socio-
symbolic reality.  Thus, in the final instance, we can say nothing definitive of this “lived 
experience.  We can only “let it present—lose—itself” (“Laughter, Presence” 383). 
 What presents—loses—itself in peals of laughter is, first and foremost, the sound of a 
voice.  More specifically, it is the sound of a voice of heterogeneity, a voice heterogeneous to 
itself: it is the sound of a voice unhinged from the voice of which it is the sound, the sound of a 
voice syncopating the vanishing of the voice that it is.  As Nancy writes, “Laughter laughs a 
voice without the qualities of a voice” (“Laughter, Presence” 388).  Laughter’s burst is the 
voice’s passage into the vacancy of voice, an offering of voice to the fall through the nothingness 
of voice.  The voice of which laughter is the offering is the evanescence of the voice.  Laughter is 
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nothing but an offering of this voice of loss, the offering of the voice in its loss, and the subject 
caught in its spell is nothing but this giving voice to loss.  Or, as Maurice Blanchot enigmatically 
writes, in laughter bursts “the very space of dying” (“The Laughter of the Gods” 182, my 
emphasis).  One can, indeed, die laughing, so they say, choking on one’s very own irrepressible 
joy—a possibility that illuminates laughter’s burst as a furtive instant in which living and dying 
coincide, an instant in which the living share voice with the dead.  Laughter’s bursting offers 
space to the shared diffraction of a dying voice, for a sharing of the voice of dying.  Laughing, 
we speak the incomprehensible glossolalia of dying women and men. 
 In the final instance, the “impossible thought” (“to laugh is to think”) bears witness to the 
fact that this “I” who is thinking—i.e.,  who is engaging in an activity whose “exercise” 
corresponds to a “suspension” of loss or expenditure, a suspension, in short, of death—is, in spite 
of its thinking, the plaything of what thinking suspends.  But the power of the “impossible 
thought” is in the reversal: laughing at its own inevitable fate (qua thought), it “breathes in the 
power of death” (qt. in DM 71).  And thus in the intimate instant of this last breath of thought, it 
is as though “I”—laughing—“commune” with the laughing dead, with this dead man whom we 
know only in a laugh, yet whom we think we know in a name: “Bataille,” at the end of whose 
labyrinthine line of thought I now laugh “as perhaps one ha[s] never laughed . . . laid bare, as if I 
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